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Terrorist havens are an important policy problem today.  The policy and academic 
literature has generally concluded that failed states are more likely to be terrorist havens, 
but some have begun to question this conventional wisdom.  While the link between state 
failure and terrorist havens is fairly clear, it does not tell the entire story.  This thesis 
borrows from an aspect of social mobilization theory to try to explain why some havens 
are more resilient to outside pressure than others.  It argues that a shared collective 
identity between the group providing haven and the havened terrorist group makes the 
havening group less likely to buckle under outside pressure.  To test this theory, the thesis 
compares the frames that define al Qaeda’s collective identity with those of the Sudanese 
National Islamic Front and the Afghan Taliban to see if observed variations in haven 
resiliency can be explained by the levels of shared collective identities in each case.  The 
findings suggest that the theory can account for the variation in resiliency, while raising 
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A relatively large number of countries have provided haven to transnational 
terrorist groups in recent years.  However, some of these havens have been better than 
others, providing a greater level and range of support, and demonstrating greater 
resistance to international efforts to dislodge those who have been provided haven.  The 
purpose of this thesis is to better understand such variations among terrorist havens.  The 
number of potential and actual havens is too large for the United States to respond 
militarily or engage in focused diplomacy in every case.  Understanding the factors that 
contribute to making particular states more likely to act as "good" terrorist havens will 
allow the United States to focus its efforts more appropriately in the Global War on 
Terrorism.   
The literature on terrorist havens has grown, but the discourse has not progressed 
very far beyond the conventional wisdom that failed states are most likely to act as 
havens.  This conventional wisdom was spawned by the American experience with al 
Qaeda in Sudan and Afghanistan, and has been supported by studies of failed states since 
the 1990s.  The CIA commissioned "Failed States Project" finds that countries that 
experience “adverse regime change, including but not limited to a state collapse” are 
more likely to be havens and that failing states constitute an “important resource” for 
international terrorists.1 Advancing a more geographically framed version of the failed 
state argument, the 9/11 Commission concludes that wide open spaces with little 
government or population and rugged terrain provide the best opportunity to plan and 
prepare for a terrorist attack.2  Scholarly research has also asserted a clear link between 
weak and/or collapsed states and terrorist havens.3   
                                                 
1 Robert H. Bates et al., Political Instability Task Force Report: Phase IV Findings. (Arlington, VA: 
George Mason University, 2003), 191. 
2 Stewart Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats:  Fact or Fiction?,” The Washington Quarterly, 
29:2 (2006), 27. 
3 John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Toward Postconflict Reconstruction,” The Washington 
Quarterly,25:4 (2002), 85; Robert Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” The Washington 




Other scholars maintain that the theorized relationship between state capacity and 
terrorist havens has not been systematically tested against all of the available evidence.4  
Patrick and Menkhaus each argue that weak states are more likely to provide attractive 
terrorist havens than those with no capacity at all, and that strong states are significantly 
vulnerable to terrorist activities undertaken by disaffected Islamic minorities.5 While 
these criticisms are well taken, it nevertheless seems fairly clear that failed and failing 
states are significantly more likely to experience terrorist activity than their more capable 
counterparts.  A simple comparison of the Failed States Index and the State Department's 
Country Reports on Terrorism shows that terrorist organizations are active in 53% of the 
least capable states, but only 23% of the most capable states.6 State failure increases the 
likelihood that a country will experience terrorism, but it does not tell the whole story.   
A few scholars have begun to probe other factors that might facilitate terrorist 
havening, either independently or in combination with state failure.  Menkhaus, for 
example, suggests that individuals, businesses, and Islamic charities might provide such 
haven in the collapsed state of Somalia.7  Similarly, Michael Innes argues that sub-state 
actors in Bosnia provided haven to terrorists.8  However, neither of these analyses 
provides clear insights into why or how such non-state actors link up with transnational 
terrorists, nor why, once established, such links prove to be more resilient in some cases 
than in others.  This thesis is therefore devoted to exploring the nature and resiliency of 
links between sub-state actors and transnational terrorists in very weak states.  I define  
 
 
                                                 
4 Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats,” 28. 
5 Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats,” 34-35; Ken Menkhaus,  “Somalia, Global Security and 
the War on Terrorism.”  Adelphi Paper 364 (2004), 49-75. 
6 Failed States Index 2006,  http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex.php (Washington, DC:  
The Fund For Peace, 2006), accessed 19 July 2006; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,  
Country Reports on Terrorism 2005. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/ (Washington, DC:  State Department, 
2006), accessed 19 July 2006.  
7 Ken Menkhaus, “Quasi-States, Nation Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens,” The Journal of Conflict 
Studies, 23:2 (2003), 12-13.   
8 Michael A. Innes, “Terrorist Sanctuaries and Bosnia-Herzegovina:  Challenging Conventional 




haven as a service provided by an actor with the capacity to make decisions.  Neither 
“open space” nor “ungoverned territory” are actors with free will, and thus neither 
condition can "provide haven."   
A. A NEW FRAMEWORK? 
Innes and Menkhaus direct our attention to the important part played by sub-state 
actors in providing haven to transnational terrorists.  Such linkages between sub-state and 
transnational actors have received significant attention in the literature on violent protest 
and rebellion.  Since terrorism is fundamentally a method of warfare (a tactic) designed 
to change the behavior of the state one would expect terrorism to have much in common 
with violent protest and rebellion.  Therefore, my theoretical framework borrows 
extensively from social mobilization theory, which lies at the heart of this literature.   
All transnational movements are rooted in domestic movements, which shift in 
scale (or spread) from one area to another either horizontally (e.g., from one province to 
another) or vertically (e.g., from the level of a province to the state).  This scale shift can 
occur through three different processes, which Tarrow and McAdam call non-relational 
diffusion, relational diffusion, and brokerage between groups.  Non-relational diffusion 
occurs when one group emulates another group’s ideas without the two groups 
interacting.  Relational diffusion occurs when a group's ideas spread to people with a 
shared identity more or less spontaneously through the social networks of members of the 
group.  Brokerage occurs when ideas are deliberately spread from one group to another 
through an emissary.9  “Rooted cosmopolitans,” or people with roots in many different 
localities and social networks, are one of the most efficient routes for both relational 
diffusion and brokerage.10   In the context of protest movements, Tarrow and McAdam 
argue that brokerage is a more difficult connection to accomplish and fails more often 
than relational diffusion, because brokerage can reveal differences between unrelated 
                                                 
9 Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam, “Scale Shift in Transnational Contention,” in Donatella Della 
Porta and Sidney Tarrow (eds), Transnational Protest and Global Activism, (NY: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2005), 127, 130. 
10Anne Marie Baylouny, “14 March class notes.” NS4300: Social Mobilization and Conflict in the 




groups as well as affirm similarities and build ties between groups.11  When ties are 
established through brokerage, they are also likely to be weaker because groups joined by 
brokered interaction tend to share fewer interests than groups joined by relational 
diffusion.12  Finally, groups joined by brokered ties tend to not share deeper interests and 
to be based on an exchange of favors.  Overall, then, relational ties are stronger than 
brokered ties because groups joined by relational diffusion have a common underlying 
identity.13  Brokerage ties are theorized to be stronger than those established through non-
relational diffusion because the personal connection established by brokerage (and 
relational diffusion) is absent when a group merely emulates another.14   
This logic provides a useful framework to begin exploring ties between substate 
actors and transnational terrorist organizations.  If the strength of the ties formed between 
groups is determined by what kind of ties was formed (with relational diffusion being the 
strongest, followed by brokerage, with non-relational diffusion creating the weakest ties), 
then the resilience of terrorist havens should be higher when the link between the substate 
actor and the transnational organization is established through relational diffusion and 
lower when the link is established through brokered ties.  Non-relational diffusion, or 
emulation, is logically impossible in the context of terrorist havening, since havening 
requires direct cooperation between the substate actor and the transnational organization 
B. IDENTITY  
A key differentiating point between brokerage and relational diffusion is shared 
identity; therefore we need to establish what constitutes a shared identity and what does 
not.  Each person has a conception of themselves that consists of many identities, such as 
gender, race, religion, family, ethnicity, and/or nation.  People are born with certain 
ascribed identities and acquire others as a result of choices and actions.15  These multiple 
                                                 
11 Tarrow and McAdam, "Scale Shift in Transnational Contention," 130. 
12 Ibid., 130-131. 
13 Ibid., 130-131. 
14 Ibid., 130-131. This is why non relational diffusion is also known as emulation in the literature. 
15 Louis Kriesberg, "Identity Issues," Beyond Intractability, Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, 
Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2003 




identities nest together, and the relative importance of each varies depending on place, 
time, and circumstance.16  Some of these identities are collective in that they are shared 
by and with others.17  “People who share the same collective identity think of themselves 
as having a common interest and a common fate.”18   Such collective identification 
involves an individual’s internalization of the “norms and characteristics” of a group and 
the individual's belief that his or her characteristics and attributes are “consistent with that 
group identification.”19  Collective identity is not simply commitment to a common 
ideology nor is it the sum of the personal identities of the individuals that make up a 
group.  Individuals can be members of an organization, but not share a collective identity 
with other organization members.20  Collective identities make collective action out of 
solidarity with the group a rational individual act because of the individual’s stake in the 
group’s fate.21  Collective ties bind one to help other members of the group in return for 
past kindnesses and consideration for future ones, as well as concern for one’s reputation 
and maintenance of status in the group.  These factors are powerful motivators for group 
solidarity and maintenance of a collective identity.22  Some of the collective identities felt 
by an individual are more strongly felt than others.23  Collective identities that clearly 
distinguish between the group and an enemy, in which group members feel the 
differences between them and the enemy strongly and that have a strong “sense of moral 
virtue” about the distinctions “should be a more potent collective identity than one in 
which either the emotional or moral dimensions are weakly developed.”24  Some of the 
ties based in collective identities are also strong enough to motivate people to fight and 
                                                 
16 Louis Kriesberg, "Identity Issues" 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Marilynn B. Brewer and Wendi Gardner, "Who is this "we"? Levels of collective identity and self 
representations," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71 (1996), 84. 
20 Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” AnnualReview 
of Sociology, 27 (2001), 298. 
21 Ibid., 289. 
22 Ibid., 289-290. 
23 Louis Kriesberg, "Identity Issues." 
24 David Snow, Collective Identity and Expressive Forms, (Irvine, California: Center for the Study of 




die “to preserve their identity group(s).”25   According to social movement theory, 
"identities play a critical role in mobilizing and sustaining participation” in a social 
movement and failure of the collective identity of the people to line up with the goals of 
the movement (as an organization) can explain why movements lose their members – 
because the movement stops representing the people who comprise its membership.26   
 Ascribed collective identities are relatively straightforward.  Acquired collective 
identities are often socially constructed when one of an individual’s personal identities 
are amplified, blended with another identity, extended to cover a new situation, or 
transformed in such a way as to override other identities.  This is most likely to occur 
when an individual is forced to deal with a contentious or changing situation, or when 
they interact with others with similar but not identical collective identities.27  Social 
movements constantly attempt to manage the collective identity of the movement and its 
members, adjusting its frames as necessary to maintain a committed membership and to 
distinguish between the group’s members, innocent bystanders, and opponents.28  
C. FRAMES AS EXPRESSIONS OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
A frame is a bumper sticker version of a movement’s message at any given 
moment.  While ideology can be thought of as being durable, frames tend to be more 
transient uses of ideology, culture, and identity that are constructed by actors to show 
injustice and/or promote the need for action to affect an interest of a group.  Frames are 
contested by factions within the group and change over time depending on which factions 
win different arguments.  There are several types of thematic frames.  A diagnostic or 
injustice frame helps create the shared perception of an injustice committed against the 
social group – it defines what is wrong.  An agency or motivational frame is a frame that 
shows the members of a social group that participation in the movement is both in the 
                                                 
25 Kriesberg, "Identity Issues."  
26 Polletta and Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” 292. 
27 David Snow and Doug McAdam, “Identity Work Processes in the Context of Social Movements: 
Clarifying the Identity/Movement Nexus,” in Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens, and Robert W. White 
(eds.), Self, Identity, and Social Movements. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 41-67. 
cited in David Snow, Collective Identity and Expressive Forms, (Irvine, California: Center for the Study of 
Democracy, 2001), 10. 




individual interest of members and that participation is also the social duty of members.  
A prognostic frame articulates the right solution to the problem identified in the injustice 
frame.  Different organizations and factions within a movement compete with each other 
to have their preferred frames adopted as those of the movement as a whole.  The 
collective identities of movements can be built on frames, a preexisting collective identity 
from earlier contentious activism, other ascriptive identities, or any combination of the 
above.29  Mobilization does not “require preexisting collective identities,” and the power 
of the invention and or creation of identities does not lie solely in the hands of organizers, 
but is equally held by the movement members.30  One of the ways to tell if members of 
two groups share the same collective identities is to determine if they are members of the 
same social groups and if they espouse similar frames.  Therefore one of the ways to 
determine if the ties al Qaeda formed with another group were based on relational 
diffusion or on brokerage is to determine whether members of the two groups shared 
ascribed and/or acquired collective identities, expressed in similar frames. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The hypothesis that relational ties lead to more resilient havens and that brokered 
ties lead to less resilient havens will be tested by a comparative case study of Sudan and 
Afghanistan.  Both are weak states that provided haven to Al Qaeda before September 11, 
2001, under similar international constraints.31    The Afghan haven demonstrated a much 
greater degree of resilience than did the Sudanese haven.  The Sudanese government 
expelled al Qaeda in response to of international criticism and cuts in foreign assistance.  
In Afghanistan, the Taliban government withstood much greater pressure and was 
ultimately deposed by force without ever expelling al Qaeda.  If my theory is correct, the 
haven in Sudan should be expect to have been established on the basis of brokered ties, 
while the one in Afghanistan should be based on relational ties. 
                                                 
29 Polletta and Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” 288, 291; Robert D. Benford and 
David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements:  An Overview and Assessment,” Annual 
Review of Sociology, 26 (2000), 613-617, 626, 628-629, 631. 
30 Polletta and Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” 291. 
31 Both cases occur before September 11, 2001, when the expectation that a non-neighboring state 
would invade and topple the government of a state for providing haven to a terrorist group was generally 
low in the international system.  The same cannot be said about the expectation in the international system 




Because collective identities are partly revealed by the frames groups espouse, 
this thesis will compare the frames espoused by al Qaeda and the sub-state actors that 
provided it haven:  the National Islamic Front (NIF) of Sudan and the Taliban of 
Afghanistan.  The next chapter provides an overview of al Qaeda and its frames as a 
point of reference.  Chapters three and four compare the NIF and the Taliban frames with 
those of al Qaeda to establish whether either havening actor shared a collective identity 
with al Qaeda, and thus whether the ties that bound each to it were brokered or relational.  
These chapters will also assess the level of resilience of the two havens in greater detail.  
The conclusion assesses the validity of my theoretical framework and suggests avenues 




II. AL QAEDA: IDENTITY, BACKGROUND, AND FRAMES 
Al Qaeda is part of the jihadi faction of the Salafi movement, and it uses several 
frames to advance its agenda and mobilize its followers.  Al Qaeda has a collective 
identity based in the shared faith of its members as Salafi Muslims, and this identity 
motivates diagnostic, prognostic, and agency frames that support the movement and its 
jihad against the United States.   
A.  THE SALAFI MOVEMENT 
The most basic division within Islam is between Sunnis (the mainstream) and 
Shia (who broke away from the Sunnis soon after the Prophet’s death over succession 
issues).  Sunni Islam is then divided into Sufi, Salafi, Wahhabi, and several other sects.  
Salafism is a loose Islamic fundamentalist movement whose practitioners (Salafis) 
believe that the proper form of Islam and Islamic way of life was demonstrated by the 
Prophet Mohammed and his companions, and should be closely emulated by Muslims 
today.  Salafism asserts that deviation from the norms set by the Prophet in the centuries 
since the founding of the faith has distorted God’s message and that the way to salvation 
is to return to the practices of Mohammed and his companions.32  Thus, Salafism is 
defined in opposition to Sufism, which permits a relatively flexible practice of Islam, and 
often includes cultural practices that predate Islamic conversion.  Sufi Muslims are 
generally divided into various orders founded by particular charismatic leaders, which 
permit varying degrees of saint worship, idolatry, and other practices that allow the 
worshiper to have a personal connection with God.  Salafists focus instead on the 
application of orthodox Islam as a comprehensive system of law, government, religion, 
and societal organization.33 
Wahhabism appeared on the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth century in 
reaction to the spread of Sufi practices.  Today Wahhabism is the official state sect of 
Saudi Arabia.  Jumping ahead slightly, the Salafi movement and the Wahhabi movements 
                                                 
32 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Framing Jihad: Intra-Movement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda’s Struggle 
for Sacred Authority,” International Review of Social History 49 (December 2004), 1-2. 





effectively merged during the 1980s under the pressure of the Afghan jihad and the 
influence of Saudi oil money.  Wahhabism thus should be thought of as the Saudi form of 
Salafism.34  The non-Saudi Salafi movement originated in the late nineteenth century, 
with the call to reform Islam by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid 
Rida, among others.35 This broader Salafi movement was a response to Western colonial 
domination of the Islamic world.  Early Salafi leaders opposed the growth of secularism 
in Muslim lands during the nineteenth and twentiety centuries as well as the Sufi sects, 
which they claimed were failing to respond adequately to the encroachment of secularism 
because of their deviations from proper Islamic practice.36  Led by Rashid Rida, Salafists 
increasingly oriented themselves towards the Wahabbist focus on emulating the Prophet 
and his followers, and away from earlier references to the practices of the “early Islamic 
centuries.”37  Following the end of the colonial period, Rida continued to advocate the 
reform of Islam as a defense against “the dangers of the west,” specifically Western 
secular liberalism.38  Salafists sought to modernize their societies within an Islamic 
framework, and increasingly defined themselves as anti-Western and as well as in 
opposition to the secular nationalist governments that dominated the Middle East in the 
1950s and 1960s.  
Sayyid Qutb, an influential Salafist intellectual, argued that offensive jihad to 
remove secular, and thus infidel, governments was permissible, if not mandated, by the 
Islamic Law.39  Qutb maintained that the entire world was ignorant of Islam, including 
the Muslim countries, in which he said “[t]he Muslim community has long ago vanished 
                                                 
34 Christopher M. Blanchard,  CRS Report for Congress:  The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and 
Salafiyya,  (Washington: Congressional Research Service), RS21695, 1-3. 
35 Esposito, Islam, 126-134. 
36 The Rightly Guided caliphs were the first four successors to the Prophet Mohammed before the 
establishment of the Ummayed dynasty in the 7th century A.D.  
37 Esposito, Islam, 132-133. 
38 Ibid., 126-130, 134. 
39 Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc:  Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, (NY: The Free Press 




from existence.”40  Therefore, Qutb contended that Islamic society had to be purified by a 
bloody jihad to rid it of Western influences.41  Qutb’s prison writings are bounded by the 
context of resistance to the Egyptian regime specifically, but they influented many of the 
later Salafi jihadists, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who expanded 
the focus to target all corrupt regimes in the Middle East, and added a call for direct 
resistance to the United States’ influence in the Middle East.42  
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 there was general 
agreement amongst Salafis that “violence in the defense of an occupied Muslim country” 
was justified and support for that effort, be it verbal, monetary, or through service in 
combat, was an obligation of “all able Muslims.”43  There was the outpouring of support 
from the broader Muslim world to the Afghans’ efforts to expel the Soviets from their 
territory.  This effort became known as the Afghan jihad.  The Salafi principle that 
support of other occupied Muslims was a personal obligation was then applied to the 
Bosnian and Palestinian struggles during the 1990s.  Following the withdrawal of the 
Soviets from Afghanistan in 1989, those who had traveled to Afghanistan to fight the 
Soviets, the so called “Arab Afghans,” returned to their home countries and began to 
advocate jihad against their own governments.   
This advocacy for jihad against Muslim rulers split the Salafi movement.  The 
new jihadi faction continued to support the prosecution of violent jihad against corrupt 
rulers, and the reformist faction continued to assert that the jihad should be one of 
“individual spiritual transformation, propagation, and advice to the rulers and … Muslim 
community” as to the correct way to live their lives.44  Jihadi movements led by returning 
‘Afghan Arabs’ in Egypt and Algeria were successfully repressed.  The Egyptian and 
Algerian jihadis then either traveled to Afghanistan to join al Qaeda, which had been 
                                                 
40 Lawrence Wright,  “The Man Behind Bin Laden:  How and Egyptian doctor became a master of 
terror,” The New Yorker, 16 September 2002, 
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/020916fa_fact2a?020916fa_fact2a, accessed 23 October 
2006. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Bergen, Holy War, Inc, 199. 
43 Wiktorowicz, 2. 




established by bin Laden toward the  end of the Afghan jihad, or put their remaining 
“networks, resources, and personnel” at al Qaeda’s disposal.45  Al Qaeda’s assertion that 
the struggles in Egypt, Algeria and elsewhere failed because of U.S. support to the 
secular governments in the region provided a broad diagnostic frame with which the 
gathering jihadis could all identify. 
The reformist and jihadi factions of the Salafi movement agree on this basic 
diagnostic frame, or problem:  “the U.S. is waging a war of aggression against Islam and 
is responsible for many of the problems in the Muslim world.”46  The preferred response 
to this threat differs, however, with the jihadis promoting violent resistance and the 
reformists advocating internal reform.  Each of the factions is supported by some 
religious scholars.47  Because religious authority in the Sunni Muslim community is 
decentralized, and the authority of scholars is based in “informal acknowledgement” of 
their expertise and reputation, Sunni Muslims rely on the reputation of scholars to 
determine the legitimacy of their religious rulings, or fatwas.48  Both jihadi and reformist 
Salifis recognize the importance and role of religious scholars as interpreters of the 
sacred texts of the faith.49  Jihadi Salafi religious scholars generally have lesser 
educational credentials than their reformist competitors, and thus rely on vilifying 
reformists for their connections with Middle Eastern governments, asserting their own 
righteous character and sincerity, and portraying reformists’ arguments as emotional and 
illogical, to boost the credibility of the jihadist message.50   
B. AL QAEDA 
Osama bin Laden grew up in Saudi Arabia a rich man’s son.  His family was well 
connected to the Saudi royal family through their successful construction firm, which did 
a lot of work for the Saudi kingdom.51  Osama bin Laden attended King Abdul Aziz 
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University in Jedda where he studied under Islamic radicals such as Abdullah Azzam, the 
spiritual founder of Hamas, and Mohammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb.52  
Between 1979 (when he was a sophomore at Aziz University) and 1981, bin Laden began 
to funnel some of his personal fortune to the jihad in Afghanistan and to humanitarian 
assistance to the Afghan population.53  Later, bin Laden would claim that he went to 
Afghanistan “within weeks” of the Soviet invasion, but he may not have actually visited 
the area until 1981, following graduation from university.54  During the mid-1980s, bin 
Laden executed various projects for the Saudi General Intelligence Department (GID) in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, including construction contracts to improve logistics and 
liaison work.55  As the war progressed, he turned his attention to building the 
infrastructure that allowed Arab volunteers to support the jihad.56   
Arab and Muslim aid organizations57 joined the United Nations and Western aid 
groups in supplying aid, relief supplies, and medical facilities to support the Afghan 
refugees within Pakistan.  The Arab and Muslim groups were supported by the same 
networks that provided funding for the armed struggle within Afghanistan.58  In 1984, 
Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden’s former professor, moved to Peshawar to help coordinate 
the Islamic charities aiding the Afghan refugees.  Beyond his contacts with the Saudi 
government, Bin Laden also worked with Azzam to support the Afghan jihad in the 
1980s, and Azzam encouraged bin Laden to financially support the fighters traveling to 
Afghanistan.59  Azzam was a firm believer in jihad as the best method of restoring the 
caliphate, and he viewed jihad as an individual obligation for every Muslim until the 
Muslim lands were restored to them.60  Azzam’s Office of Services was focused on 
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supporting the Afghans, and bin Laden joined him in this pursuit by providing funding 
and then joining the decision making process.  Through the Office of Services, bin Laden 
and Azzam recruited fighters for the jihad from the Arab world and elsewhere and paid 
their expenses.61  While bin Laden was not actively anti-American at this point, Azzam 
was and “preached stridently against the United States.”62  Bin Laden moved his family 
to Peshawar, Pakistan in 1986, and continued his growing involvement in supporting the 
jihad across the border in Afghanistan and in discussions amongst the Islamists in 
Peshawar about politics, religion, and theology.63   
As time passed the Islamists supporting the jihad from Peshawar debated about 
the nature of the war and the future.  Bin Laden began to chafe at his supporting role in 
the jihad, and to question who the enemy really was.64  As part of his growth away from 
his mentor, bin Laden began to establish training camps apart from the Pakistani 
Intelligence facilities to train the Arab volunteers in Pakistani and Afghanistan, including 
a compound at Jaji.65  In April 1987, he and fifty Arab volunteers were attacked by the 
Soviets at Jaji and forced to withdraw after a week of fighting in which bin Laden was 
wounded.66  The battle at Jaji became the centerpiece of bin Laden’s media campaign to 
popularize the jihad in Afghanistan and his self-proclaimed role as a leader of it.  Jaji also 
provided the platform from which bin Laden began advocating a wider jihad against the 
“secular governments of the Middle East, the United States, and Israel.”67  After hearing 
one of these lectures, Ayman al-Zawahiri advised bin Laden to upgrade his security, 
“because you are hitting the snake on the head.”68   
Following the expulsion of the Soviets in February 1989 the Afghan resistance 
split.  Azzam supported Ahmed Shah Massoud’s faction, while bin Laden backed 
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Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb e-Islami.69  Both Afghan leaders were also followers of 
Qutb’s theories about takfir and believed that they could declare other Muslims to be 
infidels.  The intellectual debates in Peshawar sharpened, and various jihadi groups 
declared different Muslim rulers kaffir, or infidels.70  While bin Laden endorsed such 
actions, and wanted “a wider war against impious rulers,” Azzam did not and worried 
about his protégé’s connections with the more radical groups in Peshawar.71  Azzam and 
bin Laden were breaking apart over bin Laden’s vision of “an all-Arab legion… to wage 
jihad in Saudi Arabia and Egypt,” when Azzam was assassinated in 1989.72   
Bin Laden established al Qaeda in 1988 after the battle of Jaji with three 
purposes: first, to provide security against the various Middle Eastern security services 
that were targeting the Arab Afghans; second, to follow up on missing Arab volunteers; 
and third, to continue the jihad beyond Afghanistan.73  After Azzam’s death, bin Laden 
rolled the Office of Services into al Qaeda, and departed Afghanistan for home.  During 
1990, he organized a jihad against the Marxist government of South Yemen from his 
family’s home in Jedda, with the Saudi government’s support.74  Then the Iraqis invaded 
Kuwait, and the Saudi kingdom called on its American ally to defend Saudi Arabia 
against further Iraqi aggression.  Bin Laden objected to the presence of American troops 
in Saudi Arabia, and offered to defend the kingdom with the Muslim veterans from the 
Afghan war instead.  His offer was refused, and he continued to object, asserting that the 
Americans were the true masters of the Saudi Arabian government.75  His open dissent 
against the Saudi government deepened as part of a broader movement against the easing 
of Islamic restrictions and the presence of U.S. forces in the kingdom, and he left Saudi 
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Arabia for Pakistan.76  Bin Laden continued to speak out against the kingdom from 
Pakistan, now openly advocating its overthrow. 77 When Hasan al-Turabi, leader of the 
ruling National Islamic Liberation Front (NIF) in Sudan, sent a delegation to Pakistan to 
invite bin Laden to come to Sudan to help train the NIF, and bin Laden accepted out of 
concern for his security.78 
C. FRAMES OF AL QAEDA 
Al Qaeda’s diagnostic frame asserts that Muslims everywhere are under attack 
from the West, led by the United States.  This attack is facilitated by corrupt un-Islamic 
governments in the Middle East, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which ally 
themselves with the U.S. to ensure their own survival.  If U.S. support were withdrawn, 
the frame suggests, these corrupt regimes could then be removed by the jihadis.  Al 
Qaeda’s prognostic frame thus calls for a jihad against the United States to undermine its 
power and remove its support from corrupt local regimes, and from Israel.  After the 
U.S.’s influence is removed, these regimes should be overthrown, Israel destroyed, and a 
caliphate established in their place.  The agency frame proclaims that jihad is the 
individual duty of every Muslim, particularly when repelling an invasion or occupation of 
Muslim lands.79   
The diagnostic frame alludes to the West’s occupation of Islam’s holiest places: 
Israeli control of Jerusalem, and the presence of United States and British forces in Saudi 
Arabia.  These “occupying forces” are characterized the “Zionist-Crusader alliance.”80    
This frame had broad appeal, as U.S. forces operating from Saudi Arabia to monitor Iraqi 
compliance with UN sanctions following the Gulf War were seen as occupiers by many 
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Arabs, particularly Saudis.  This frame gained even greater traction among Saudis 
following the September 11 attacks.81  Al Qaeda also asserted that United Nations 
sanctions against Iraq following its expulsion from Kuwait, and efforts by the U.S. and its 
allies to enforce them, constituted further attacks by the West on Muslims.  In bin 
Laden’s 1996 fatwa, Al Qaeda blames the United States and Israel for the massacre of 
Muslims worldwide, and claims that these massacres show that Muslims are “the main 
target for the aggression of the Zionist-Crusader alliance.”  Many Saudis identify with bin 
Laden’s desire to have the Americans and British (whom they also see as colonialists) 
leave Saudi Arabia, and the claim  that the West is “persecuting Muslims” gained broader 
acceptance in reference to the situations in Palestine and Iraq.  Broad identification with 
this frame is one of the reasons that al Qaeda does not lack for recruits.82 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s confidant from the Afghan jihad, was one of 
those who had returned to Egypt following the Afghan jihad and tried and failed to 
overthrow the government there through his organization Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), 
which would later ally itself with al Qaeda.83  While EIJ’s opposition to the Egyptian 
regime is evident in its actions, bin Laden’s opposition to the Saudi regime is evident in 
his public pronouncements.  In the 1996 fatwa, bin Laden attacked “the Saudi regime for 
its corruption and anti-Islamic policies,”84 and outlined the Saudi Arabia kingdom’s 
faults: 
illegitimate behaviour and measures of the ruling regime: Ignoring the 
divine Shari'ah law; depriving people of their legitimate rights; allowing 
the American to occupy the land of the two Holy Places; imprisonment, 
unjustly, of the sincere scholars.85 
Bin Laden further accused the regime of impotence and illegitimacy because of its 
need to call in the Americans, despite the “[e]xpensive” arms deals the kingdom had let 
out. Al Qaeda’s grievances against the Saudi kingdom were amplified by the poor 
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economic situation in the 1990s due to low oil prices, and al Qaeda accused the regime of 
restricting oil sales to better suit American rather than Saudi needs.86   Al Qaeda also felt 
that the kingdom’s taxes, permission of usury, and oppression of dissident clerics were 
also un-Islamic.87  These accusations tap directly into the basic doctrinaire Salafi frames 
for an Islamic society in which an Islamic government rules through Sharia law and 
presides over an Islamic economy.  Because al Qaeda was largely led by Egyptians and 
its foot soldiers were mostly Saudis and Yemenis, al Qaeda’s frames focused on local 
issues in Egypt and Saudi Arabia for recruitment and to maintain the participation of its 
members.  At the same time, broader Arab issues, like the occupation of Jerusalem by the 
Israelis, were also utilized to broaden the base and maintain involvement All of these 
issues had long been central to the Salafi movement as a whole.  
Al Qaeda’s prognostic frames identify a two phased response to Western 
aggression and corrupt local regimes: jihad against the United States, and the 
establishment of an Islamic Caliphate.   When the West and its local collaborators are 
defeated by jihad, Al Qaeda envisions a return to a form of government consistent with 
what that practiced during the time of the Prophet Mohammed and his four Rightly 
Guided successors, or caliphs.88  As an organization Al Qaeda practices this form of 
governance.   Decisions are made through consultative shuras and committees, under the 
direction of bin Laden, much as Salafis perceive the decision making process to have 
been under the Rightly Guided Caliphs.89  In 1999, bin Laden explicitly added the 
restoration of a Caliphate including the entire Muslim world to al Qaeda’s prognostic 
frame.  Like the diagnostic frame, the prognostic frame has a great deal of pull on al 
Qaeda members and followers.90  The restoration of the Caliphate is an intrinsically 
Salafi frame, almost by definition, because the Salafis desire to imitate the period of the 
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Rightly Guided Caliphs as the last point in Islamic history where they were favored by 
God because they were governing according to His word.  
Al Qaeda mobilizes followers to support the jihad against the United States by 
framing it as an individual’s Islamic duty.91  Al Qaeda, like other contemporary and 
historical extremist groups, views jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam.92  In his 1996 fatwa, 
bin Laden placed jihad to expel the Americans from the “holy land” above all other 
Islamic duties “except belief” and claimed that Muslims had a duty to set aside all other 
differences to expel the Americans, even if it means using “non righteous military 
personnel and commanders.”93  Al Qaeda frames the jihad as a defensive war against an 
occupying power rather than as an offensive war, which is generally frowned upon in 
Islam.94   
D. CONCLUSION 
The chapters that follow will compare al Qaeda’s frames with the frames of the 
national movements in Sudan and Afghanistan to determine how well they correspond in 
order to test the hypothesis that al Qaeda had brokered ties to the National Islamic Front 
in Sudan, resulting in observed low level of haven resilience, and relational ties to the 
Taliban in Afghanistan, resulting in the observed high level of haven resilience.    
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III. SUDAN: THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT 
The National Islamic Front (NIF) is the most radical of Sudan’s three main 
political parties, all of which are Islamist.  It emerged out of the Sudanese Muslim 
Brotherhood after the removal of the military regime of President Nimieri in 1985.95  The 
Muslim Brotherhood was formed in Egypt in 1928 and is a “militant organization with a 
fundamentalist Islamic theology.”96  Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, a lecturer at the University in 
Khartoum, has been a leader of the Islamist movement in Sudan since 1964, when he led 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and he has acted in a formal or informal leadership role since 
that time despite his period falls from favor, including his most recent ouster by President 
Umar al-Bashir in 2000. 97  The Muslim Brotherhood started as a student movement in 
opposition to the Communist student movement.98  Under Turabi, the Muslim Brothers in 
Sudan worked against the politically and religiously dominant Sufi orders, whose 
deviations from proper Islamic practice it blamed for the discord in the Sudanese 
society.99  Turabi and other members of the NIF elite are Western educated, comfortable 
with city life, and disconnected from Sudanese local culture.100  While the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt favored a more evolutionary approach to the Islamization of 
society through education and reform of the law to comply with Sharia, the Muslim 
Brothers of Sudan took a more radical tack, seizing control of the state and imposing an 
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what Zawahiri’s EIJ, and other organizations founded by Afghan Arabs were advocating 
in the 1990s.  Seizure of the state was the sin qua non for achieving Turabi's and his 
follower’s vision.102   
Sudan, like many African countries, is an accident of colonial history that resulted 
in a populace divided on the basis of religion, cultural identity, tribal affiliation, and 
economic system.  Religiously, the population is divided between Muslims (70%) and 
non-Muslims.  The non-Muslims are both Christian (5%) and Animist (25%), and live 
primarily in the south.  The ethnic divide is also a geographic division between the Center 
North, whose people have been converted to Arab culture, and the South, whose peoples 
have not.  The Eastern region is populated both by peoples identifying themselves as 
Arab, and as African.  There are tribal divisions throughout the country and mainly effect 
the non-Arab south and east, though Darfur and other Islamized areas are also affected.  
Economics also divides the country between those groups that have become sedentary 
and those who are still pastoralists; this division crosscuts the North especially.  All of 
these divisions (religious, cultural, tribal, and economic) intermingle.103  The result is a 
country that has been in “near constant conflict since it became independent 1956,” most 
intensely between the ‘Muslim’ north and the ‘Christian and Animist’ south.  In addition 
to open civil war between 1956 and 1972 and again between 1983 and 2005, Sudan has 
experienced a revolving series of coups, military dictatorships, partial democracy, 
repression, and (according to some) genocide.104   
Arabized Muslim northerners, comprising about 40% of the population, have 
dominated Sudanese politics since before independence in 1956.  The non-Muslim 
southern third of the country was separated from the Muslim North by the British during 
the colonial era, and efforts by the Arabized Muslim elite to spread their culture and 
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religion amongst the southerners, halted by British colonialism, were resumed following 
independence.105    Sudan's two oldest political parties, the Democratic Unionist Party 
backed by the Khatmiyya Sufi sect and the Umma Party backed by the Mahdist Sufi sect, 
were dominant throughout most of the early 20th century.  They were joined by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s.106  The National Islamic Front, a Turabi-led derivative 
of the Muslim Brothers, would emerge as a party in 1985.107  All three parties have 
consistently expressed support for the establishment of an Islamic State, governed under 
Sharia law, in Sudan.  However, all three have faced the same fundamental obstacle to 
achieving that end: non-Muslim Southerners would rather fight that be governed under 
Sharia law.  Thus, the establishment of an Islamic state and the maintenance of the 
territorial integrity of Sudan, the two essential goals of all three parties, have always been 
fundamentally at odds with one another.108 
As a member of an earlier incarnation of the NIF, the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), 
al-Turabi first participated in government during the military regime of Ja’far Nimieri, 
after Nimieri suddenly shifted the ideology of his regime from socialism to Islamism in 
the late 1970s.109  When Nimieri accused the Islamists of undermining his regime in1985 
and attempted to distance himself from the Islamist agenda, the Muslim Brotherhood led 
the popular uprising that overthrew him.110 After the uprising the army oversaw a 
transition to democracy and handed power to an elected government in 1986.111  The two 
historically dominant Islamists parties, the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist 
Party finished first and second in the 1986 elections, with the NIF finishing a surprisingly 
strong third.  Having failed to secure a majority in parliament, the Umma Party formed a 
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coalition government with the DUP from 1986 through 1988, under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Saddiq al Mahdi.  Due to differences in opinion, al Mahdi dropped the 
DUP from the governing coalition in favor of the NIF and moved toward Islamization 
and away from accommodating the south.112  Although all three parties were committed 
to the proper implementation of Shariah law (Umma and DUP opposed Nimieri’s 
application of Sharia as corrupt and un-Islamic), Umma and DUP backed off the Islamist 
agenda in an effort to end the civil war, which had restarted in 1983 partly in response to 
Nimieri’s Islamization agenda.  The democratic government of Saddiq al Mahdi, after 
much vacillating, agreed to end Sharia law in the South, which was a key demand of the 
Southern rebels.  In response to this policy, the NIF withdrew from the government and 
supported a military coup against it.  Street demonstrations by the NIF rank and file 
commenced in the spring of 1989, and General Umar al-Bashir overthrew the democratic 
regime in June 1989.113  The NIF would back the military government and provide the 
ideology that supported it over the coming eleven years.  
A. FRAMES OF THE NIF 
After coming to power in 1989, Turabi and his adherents expected that with the 
global collapse of communism as an ideology, political Islam would spread virally and 
wipe out competing secular ideologies and states in the Muslim world.114  Turabi also 
expected that the Islamic revival following the Cold War would enhance the exclusivity 
of the Islamic identity and culture.115  Turabi was the brains behind the brawn in Sudan 
during the 1990s, and was the real leader of the government from behind the scenes.116  
Although Turabi was briefly arrested with the other political party leaders immediately 
following the coup, he is widely believed to have been behind the coup from the planning 
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stages.117  In any case, the NIF’s seizure of power following the 1989 coup dissolved the 
movement into the state and committed the party to holding power by force, since the 
1986 election have revealed that its popular support was far from sufficient for it to hold 
power democratically.118 
The NIF had announced its political program two years prior to the coup in the 
January 1987 document “Sudan Charter: National Unity and Diversity.”  In that 
document, the NIF declared the Sudanese to be “one nation” with common values that 
transcended the many religious and cultural traditions in the country.119  The NIF asserted 
that the Sudanese were “bound by one common allegiance to nation and land,” but 
African - Arab divisions within Sudan should be respected in domestic as well as in 
foreign relations.120  It went on to declare that Sharia should be the predominant source of 
law in Sudan, since Muslims composed the majority of the Sudanese population.  The 
program described would allow the other faith and cultural groups to be governed in their 
own local areas by their own local laws, but Sharia was to be the predominant source for 
the law of the land despite the allowances for personal religious freedom that the NIF 
built into its political treatise.   The remainder of the document advocated a vigorous 
peace process similar to what the international community has prescribed as a way out of 
the civil wars in Sudan.121 
The NIF had three frames, two of which were widely shared by supporters of all 
three Islamist parties.  The first frame was inherently Sudanese: the commitment to a 
unitary, Arab, Sudanese state.122  The second frames was the establishment and 
maintenance of Sharia Law, which was in a position of tension with the first, given the 
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longstanding resistance of the non-Muslim southern population to the imposition of 
Sharia.  The third frame, espoused by the NIF alone, advocated support for the jihad 
against corrupt Muslim rulers everywhere, and active cooperation among Islamist groups 
seeking to remove them.     
1. An Arab Identity 
An Arab Sudanese identity was a mainstay of the NIF’s cultural framework and a 
core part of its identity.  While the NIF was prepared to tolerate deviance from their Arab 
and Islamic norm, the Arab Muslims were by far the largest population group in Sudan 
(40%), and the NIF felt that they had the right to create a national identity with 
themselves at the core. As such, the maintenance of Arabic as the national language was 
part of the NIF’s political platform.  Once in power, the NIF pursued the Arabization of 
the south and west of the country, despite pledging tolerance for ethnic groups as part of 
their pre-coup charter.123  This drove demands for secession from the south, which the 
NIF rejected out of hand on the basis of its commitment to a unitary state. Under the 
leadership of John Garang, the rebel Southern Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) 
shared the NIF (and Umma and DUP) frame of a single Sudanese nation and a unitary 
state: it disagreed forcefully, however, about the definition of the Sudanese national 
identity.  Garang and others outside the North/central Arabcore, favored a broader, more 
inclusive construction of Sudanese identity.124 
The NIF generally construed being Muslim with being Arab.125  Members of the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the military government that governed Sudan 
following the coup, that were not NIF members or Arabs were sidelined from the 
decision making process.126  NIF leaders from outside the Arab clique defected to the 
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marginalized DUP or the SPLA (the southern rebel group), feeling themselves 
discriminated against as non-Arabs.127  Arab racism and Islam were intimately connected 
in the minds of many of the Sudanese people, leading to an escalation of conflicts 
between outlying communities and the Arabized center during the NIF reign.128   
2. Islamic Law and Government 
The application of Islamic law, extending into all aspects of life, was a critical 
central theme for the NIF regime.  It underpinned all of the NIF’s programs and was a 
central part of the NIF’s framing strategy and its identity.  Turabi, like the Salafist 
thinkers Hassan al-Banna and Abdul A’la al-Mawdudui, believes that Islam must 
permeate every aspect of private and public affairs, and thus Muslims must live within an 
Islamic state.129  Turabi emphasizes the Unity of God (tahwid) in all aspects of life, that 
“all [of] life is just one program of worship, whether it’s economics, politics, sex, private, 
public or whatever.”130  Unitarianism, for Turabi, “explains almost every aspect of 
doctrinal or practical Islam.”131  As part of the unity of God’s rule, the NIF emphasized 
the centrality of Sharia in governing all aspects of society.  Beyond merely the law, “[t]he 
economy, educational system, and social programs” had to be part of the Islamic system 
and based in its principles.132  Islam had to govern in order for the people to be good 
Muslims.133  Turabi and members of his movement took advantage of the various regimes 
prior to the 1989 coup to gradually further the Islamist agenda from within.  They helped 
establish Islamic banking and economics, a key part of Mawdudi’s doctrine, during the 
Nimeiri regime long before Sharia law was implemented.134   
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Islamic Law was central to the rationale behind the NIF’s street demonstrations 
leading up to the 1989 coup and remained an important part of the government’s 
legitimating ideology after the NIF seized power.  Maintenance of Sharia was the issue 
that put NIF loyalists into the streets between April and June 1989.  The NIF leadership 
claimed that people were in the streets “because the government had lost its legitimacy by 
freezing haudud….”135  The NIF Secretary General, Yasin Umar al-Imam, stated that the 
goal of the NIF’s demonstrations was to either compel the government to switch back to 
Sharia or cause the government to fall.136  The suspension of Sharia in exchange for 
southern participation in constitutional discussions “triggered the NIF’s coup.”137  After 
the 1989 coup, the Turabi regime reinstated Sharia law, with all of the haudud 
punishments (such as amputations), in March 1991.138  In Khartoum, the courts began 
applying haudud punishments locally in 1989 to all citizens, including non-Muslims.139  
Implementation of Sharia throughout Sudan, even in the non-Muslim areas, was a non-
negotiable goal for the NIF, and the NIF followed through on its promises when it got 
into power.140   
The military members who led the 1989 coup established a Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) to govern following the coup.  The powers of the non-Islamist 
RCC members were bounded by the NIF, and the entire RCC was guided by a NIF led 
Council of Forty that oversaw the political program as a consultative body (shura).  The 
RCC increasingly purged dissident members through its four year reign, after which it 
was replaced by an appointed Council of Ministers dominated by the NIF.  Bashir was 
appointed President by the RCC, technically limiting his power.  The NIF tried to 
broaden participation from the Sudanese people by establishing an appointed Transitional 
National Assembly (TNA) in 1992, but the NIF dominated 80% of the TNA, effectively 
broadening participation in the government within the NIF.  Elections under the NIF 
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government were neither free nor fair.  When the NIF lost elections, they merely voided 
the results and fixed the outcome on the next round.  Turabi assumed a central role as 
speaker of the national assembly, and Islam continued as the guiding principle for 
government.141  The Sudanese government between 1989 and 1996 was broadly inclusive 
of the people who counted – the Islamists of the NIF. 
The 1993 civilian government made Islam the central guidance for all citizens, 
and enforced Islamic law on all citizens with only very limited exceptions.  Those 
Muslims who disagreed were, according to a fatawa from the Kordofan Ulama, 
“…apostates, and non-Muslims [were] heathens” and, accordingly, it was “the duty of 
Islam to fight and kill both categories.”142  The government declared that the war against 
the southern rebels was a jihad, waged by mujahidin who, when martyred, ascended 
directly to heaven.  The police and army swore oaths of fealty (bayat) to Bashir, and the 
booty they gathered during their operations in the South had to be divided in accordance 
with Islamic Law.143  
The application of Islamic law as a means of governing was a non-negotiable 
facet of the NIF’s rule.  The NIF interpreted Islamic law and its attendant social 
restrictions strictly, which is consistent with a Salafist approach to Islam.  This approach, 
that required traditional oaths of fealty for underlings, executed or maimed violators of 
the law, and prosecuted jihad against the enemies of the states is entirely consistent with 
al Qaeda’s Salafist identity.  The NIF’s form of government rejected Western liberal 
democracy in favor of a one party state that included the NIF and sidelined other parties.  
Islam was the guiding principle for law and government under the NIF’s authoritarian 
rule, but it never attempted to emulate a caliphate or other historically Muslim 
governance structure.  While military commanders and tribal leaders assumed Islamic 
titles with Bashir’s consent, these titles did not extend to the highest levels of 
government.144  Neither Turabi nor Bashir were the ‘Commander of the Faithful,’ the 
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‘Emir’ or the ‘Caliph’.  Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir was a Lieutenant General who 
became the chair of the Revolutionary Command Council in 1989, the Prime Minister, 
the Defense Minister, the Minister of Culture and Information between 1991 and 1992, 
and the President of Sudan beginning in 1993.145  Hasan al-Turabi did not assume an 
official position in the government until 1996, when he was “elected” to parliament and 
selected as the Speaker of the National Assembly.146  Note that this was a “National 
Assembly,” not a shura.  The Sudanese state was run as a western one party state under 
the NIF.  Islam provided the guiding principles of the Sudanese government (in theory), 
but Islam was not the Sudanese government.   
For all the consistency on application of Sharia law between the Salafists and the 
NIF, the NIF was not Salafist.  It did not idolize any particular period of Muslim history, 
and it disagreed with the practices of Sufism for different reasons than the Salafists do.  
The Salafists reject the legitimacy of the traditional Islamic Sufi ulema because of their 
deviations in practice from the Rashadun.  The NIF rejected the legitimacy of the ulema 
because they arrogated themselves above the people as the proper interpreters of Islam 
and separated religion from the state.147  Therefore, while al Qaeda and the NIF might 
very well agree on what Sharia said, they disagree on the governmental model through 
which it should be implemented.  For Turabi, an Islamic state was a state governed by 
good Muslims embracing an Islamic modernity, rather than a state governed by a set of 
Islamic principles embedded in ancient historical patterns.148   
3. Support for Revolutionaries 
Turabi set the internationalist agenda for the Sudan.  In his writings, he sees a 
future where Islam will transcend international borders and make them obsolete as more 
people submit to Islam, resulting in a return to Islamic empire.  Turabi sought to lead 
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radical Islam in pursuit of wider power.149  To support that agenda, he supported Islamic 
Fundamentalists wherever they were.150  The NIF adopted Turabi’s vision of spreading 
Islam throughout Africa, as demonstrated by the slogan on its banner: “We will only stop 
when the forces of Islam have raised the Islamic flag over [Cape Town] and the whole 
continent of Africa has been Islamized.” 151 Sudan supported Islamic terrorist groups 
from the neighboring countries of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.152  The NIF also sought to 
build brides to Islamists movements in the Arab world.  It established governmental ties 
with Iran, and used Iranian aid to further its agenda in the South in exchange for 
furthering Iran’s agenda of spreading Iranian revolution and the Islamist message, and in 
supporting the war in Palestine and Lebanon.  Turabi established the Popular Arab and 
Islamic Conference (PAIC) to unite Islamist and Arab movements in their struggles 
against the corrupt regions in the region.  Iran materially supported this effort.153  In his 
writings, Turabi admits that the NIF supported Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Front in Algeria, and Islamists in Tunisia in their efforts to 
overthrow governments.154  Press reports claim that he also permitted the training of 
“Hamas activists” on Sudanese soil between 1992 and 1993.155  Turabi hosted and 
mediated a strategic meeting between Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
between the 2nd and 4th of January 1993 in Khartoum.156  The NIF also spread its support 
further afield, supporting the jihad in Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, the Philippines, 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Yemen by providing a safe place to train, plan, 
and organize, by providing travel documents, and a by providing venue through which to 
                                                 
149 de Waal and  Salam, “Islamism, State Power and Jihad in Sudan,” 82. 
150 Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle, 31-33; Hassan al-Turabi, The Islamic Movement in Sudan, 
(Cairo: The Arab Reader Publications, 1991), 252-256, cited in Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle, 
38-39; Gallab, “The Insecure Rendezvous Between Islam and Totalitarianism” 
151 Sudan Democratic Gazette 45, February, 1994, cited in Lesch, The Sudan, 213. 
152 Carney, “The Sudan: Political Islam and Terrorism,” 123-124. 
153 Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle, 35-38; Carney, “The Sudan: Political Islam and Terrorism,” 
125.  
154 Hassan al-Turabi, The Islamic Movement in Sudan, (Cairo: The Arab Reader Publications, 1991), 
252-256, cited in Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle, 39. 
155 Ehud Ya’ari, “The Metamorphosis of Hamas,” The Jerusalem Report, 14 January 1993. 




smuggle arms and launder money.157  Turabi’s efforts not only transcended ethnic 
divisions and the Sunni/Shia divide, they crossed religious boundaries as well.  Secular 
Arab nationalist movements, like the PLO, were included in Turabi’s meetings.  Turabi 
also reached out to Christians in a series of meetings in 1993 and 1994, seeking to unite 
pious Christians and Muslims against the heathens.158   
Turabi was an Arab Islamic revolutionary, tolerant of ethnic and religious 
divisions, with designs on the broader Muslim world.  What the religious tenets of such 
an empire would have been under Turabi’s influence are less than clear, he was 
unquestionably more interested in creating an Islamic modernity than returning to an 
Islamist past.  However he, and perforce the NIF, were committed to supporting Islamic 
revolution, in various forms, in league with Shia Iran, Salafi Afghan Arabs, and even 
secular nationalist Palestinian groups.  
B. CREATION AND RESILIENCY OF AL QAEDA’S SUDANESE HAVEN 
After the end of the Afghan jihad the Afghan Arabs considered using Sudan as a 
base of operations.159  Turabi welcomed bin Laden to Sudan in April 1991.160  Peter 
Bergen, working from Jamal al-Fadl’s testimony in the United States’ case against bin 
Laden, described the relationship between bin Laden and Turabi as a “symbiotic” one.  In 
return for bin Laden making economic investments in Sudan, trying to convince other 
Arab businessmen to do the same, and the supply of small arms and communications gear 
to the NIF al Qaeda was granted sanctuary in Sudan and two hundred passports to 
facilitate the travel of al Qaeda members.161  Bin Laden invested millions into Sudan’s 
farming, construction, trucking, manufacturing, and banking sectors.  The companies he 
founded provided cover for al Qaeda’s other activities.162    
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Al Qaeda used Sudan as a base to support the spread of Islamic government in the 
Middle East and to attrite the power of the United States in the region.  It smuggled 
weapons and equipment across the unguarded Sudanese/Egyptian border through 
“ancient caravan trails.”163  Al Qaeda also received operational training from Hezbollah 
and arms from Iran while in Sudan.164  Turabi’s Pan Islamic People’s Conferences in 
1991, 1993, and 1995 allowed al Qaeda to make contacts with other Salafist groups from 
Pakistan, Algeria, Tunisia, and Palestine.165   
Nineteen ninety three was a busy year for terrorism supported from Sudan.  Al 
Qaeda claimed that it conducted operations against American targets in Somalia, in the 
1993 Battle of Mogadishu, and in Yemen.166  Sudan supported the 1993 bombing of the 
World Trade Center by Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) leader Sheikh Omar Abdel 
Rahman through staff at its UN mission in New York City.167  The Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad (EIJ) and EIG tried and failed to assassinate the Egyptian interior minister in 
August 1993.  The attack killed and maimed bystanders, including the Speaker of 
Parliament.168  The August 1993 attack undermined EIJ’s popular base in Egypt, forcing 
EIJ to seek external support – essentially driving EIJ and al Qaeda together.169  In 
response to EIG’s operation against the World Trade Center in New York and because of 
Sudan’s alledged support for that operation the United States put Sudan on the State 
Department’s list of State sponsors of terrorism in 1993 and increased economic pressure 
on Sudan.170 
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In April 1995 EIG and EIJ, the two largest Egyptian jihadi organizations tried and 
failed to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.171  Al 
Qaeda and the Sudanese government materially supported the assassination attempt. 172  
The Mubarak assassination attempt led to reprisals against acquaintances and fellow 
villagers of EIJ members by the Egyptian government.173 Three of the assassins fled to 
Sudan, and the UN imposed sanctions on Sudan after it refused to extradite the assassins.  
The UN imposed sanctions on Sudan via UNSCR 1054 and 1070.174  UNSCR 1054 
directed UN member states to reduce their diplomatic personnel in Sudan, restrict the 
travel of Sudanese governmental officials, and requested that “international and regional 
organizations [not hold] any conference in Sudan” as of 10 May 2006.175  UNSCR 1070 
banned Sudanese air traffic.176  
In early 1996, the U.S. withdrew its U.S. staff because of (now discredited) 
intelligence indicating that the Sudanese government was going to try to assassinate then 
U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake.177  Before the U.S. staff withdrew to a 
neighboring country, U.S. Ambassador to Sudan Timothy Carney and his State 
Department superior David Shinn had a candid conversation with the Sudanese Foreign 
Minister, Ali Osman Taha about Sudan’s support for terrorism.  This conversation led to 
a two track diplomatic effort between Sudanese Intelligence and the CIA and the 
Ambassador and the Sudanese Foreign Minister.178  The result of these talks was that by 
March/April 1996, Sudan expelled “some Middle Eastern groups” and allowed the U.S. 
to examine the camps they had occupied.179  The discussion on bin Laden and al Qaeda 
revealed that the United States did not have enough to indict him, but he was causing 
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problems for the Saudi royal family and the U.S. at least wanted bin Laden expelled from 
Sudan.180  The Sudanese offered to expel bin Laden to Saudi Arabia, but the Saudis, who 
had stripped bin Laden of his citizenship in 1994, would not take him unless he 
apologized for his position against the Saudi regime.181  Nevertheless the Sudanese 
government expelled him on 20 May 1996, just three months after the U.S. had begun the 
negotiations.182  Turabi, by most accounts, personally told bin Laden to leave.183  Bin 
Laden flew to Jalalabad, Afghanistan to regroup.184 
C. AL QAEDA’S AND THE NIF’S FRAMES COMPARED 
The ascribed Arab identity shared by both the NIF and al Qaeda should have 
facilitated relational diffusion according to our theory.  However, while the NIF framed 
their movement as an Arab movement, al Qaeda tended to look beyond the ascriptive 
Arab identity shared by many of its members and to focus more on a pan Islamic identity.  
As such, the sharing of this ascriptive tie should be expected to be less important than 
other the other frames expressed by the NIF and al Qaeda.   
The NIF’s fundamentally nationalist approach to Islamic revolution clearly 
distinguished its frames from al Qaeda’s frame of establishing a broader caliphate.  The 
NIF supported Islamist revolutionaries from around the globe, and sought to increase 
cooperation between them as a means of increasing their effectiveness.  But it never 
defined the Islamic revolution other than in national terms.  This difference in framing 
between al Qaeda and the NIF expressed itself in the NIF’s choice of regime type, which 
was a modern one party state rather than a historically Arab or Islamic emirate or 
caliphate.   
Nevertheless, the NIF and al Qaeda did share a strict Islamic reform doctrine with 
roots in the eighteenth century Salafist movement.  But again the differences are more 
striking than the similarities.  The NIF was not Salafist, and did not seek to emulate the 
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past; rather the NIF was strictly modernist, and seeking to define an Islamic modernity.185  
This aspect of the NIF’s ideology was not consistent throughout its membership – there 
were factions within the NIF that looked towards the past rather than to the future – but 
the NIF under Turabi’s leadership was focused on achieving a modern state.186  And this 
dominant frame was never adjusted to accommodate al Qaeda’s frames. 
Similarly, while the NIF and al Qaeda agreed that corrupt regimes were the 
appropriate target for their revolutions, but the NIF did not have, and never adopted, al 
Qaeda’s (and the Salafi movement’s) most important diagnostic frame -- that America 
and the West was attacking Islam – or its corollary prognostic frame -- that jihad against 
the United States was therefore necessary.  A common enemy is a powerful indicator of 
collective identity, but with the exception of possible support for the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing, the NIF’s support for international jihad was focused on the Middle 
East, at the national level.187  The NIF dealt with the United States at a governmental 
level, and the CIA and State department had a relationship with their Sudanese 
counterparts throughout the NIF’s tenure.188    
In a brokered relationship, the relationship is about the exchange of services 
between the parties.  It is about fulfilling tangible obligations and meeting the interests of 
the parties in the expectation that doing so will allow the relationship to continue.  In a 
relationship based on relational diffusion, the parties involved in the relationship do 
things for one another because of the relationship, even if it is contrary to their immediate 
or long term interests.  They expect payback later, to be sure, but there is give in the 
relationship in which one member can take a lot from the other member(s), and the other 
members will continue to give because of the relationship.  It is why family members will 
drop each other off at work despite great inconveniences or lie to the police to protect one 
of their own.  The NIF - al Qaeda relationship seems to have been purely based on 
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brokered exchange of services.  The NIF received economic investments and some 
communications gear in exchange for providing al Qaeda a place to live and train.  The 
relationship never developed any deeper than a business deal because the two groups did 
not share common identities and enemies to draw them closer together. When the NIF 
had to choose between getting along with the United States and other states or supporting 
al Qaeda or Carlos the Jackal, it gave them up because the relationship to either al Qaeda 
or the Jackal was far less important than Sudan’s interests in the international community. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Consistent with the hypothesis, al Qaeda and the NIF did not have strong shared 
collective identities, and thus the relationship between them as brokered rather than 
relational.  Al Qaeda helped the NIF by investing economically in Sudan and by 
providing weapons and equipment to arm the NIF’s cadres in their war against the 
southerners.  The NIF provided al Qaeda sanctuary and passports.  This exchange of 
services was the apparent foundation of their relationship.  The NIF and al Qaeda were 
both Islamist movements, and the discontinuities in doctrine and practice between the 
two groups were not an impediment to cooperation.  However, when the U.S. began to 
apply pressure, these differences in doctrine facilitated the NIF’s abandonment of al 
Qaeda and other groups.  The difference in the identification of the enemy was a deal 
breaker for the haven.  Because the relationship between the NIF and al Qaeda was only 
about goods and services and not about their shared ties, the Sudanese negotiated with the 
United States and expelled bin Laden in exchange for the more valuable favors the U.S. 





























IV. AFGHANISTAN:  THE TALIBAN 
The Taliban rose out of the chaos following the Soviet withdraw from 
Afghanistan in 1989.  The Soviet installed leader of the Afghan government was 
Mohammad Najibullah, who lost the civil war with the mujahedin in 1992. Najibullah 
would survive until the Taliban seized control of Kabul in 1996 and executed him.189  
After Najibullah’s fall in 1992 it did not take long for the competing mujahedin factions 
to begin fighting amongst themselves as the power sharing agreements established to 
govern Afghanistan following the fall of Najibullah’s communist regime fell apart.  By 
1993, a full scale civil war was on and the various (mostly ethnically determined) 
factions fought and changed sides regularly.190  Pakistan backed a Pashtun faction led by 
Gulbadin Hekmatyar, whom they had favored during the war against the Soviets, to 
further their interests in the country.  Hekmatyar was unable to defeat a similarly armed 
Tajik faction led by Ahmad Shah Massoud and the selected President of Afghanistan, 
Burhanuddin Rabbani. 191  Another Pashtun faction on the Pakistani border, a Shia faction 
on the Iranian border, and an Uzbek faction under General Dostum in the north 
complicated the war as factions shifted and aligned to support local interests.192   
All of the men who formed the initial Taliban cadre in Kandahar were former 
students of the Haqqannia madrassa east of Peshawar, Durrani Pashtuns, and veterans of 
the anti-Soviet jihad.193    The shared framework of education at Haqqannia ensured that 
all of the initial Taliban subscribed to the Deobandi school of Islam, which was anti-
modern, focused on living like the followers of the Prophet Mohammad during the 
Prophet’s lifetime and during the rule of his four successors, the rightly guided caliphs.  
Deobandism is also very much like the Wahabbi school of Islam in that they disdained 
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images and music.  Being rural Pashtuns, they all tended to believe, in accordance with 
both tribal custom and their faith, in the seclusion of women – though in practice in 
normal rural life, this rule was not strictly kept among relatives.194  As Durrani Pashtuns, 
they had strong tribal ties, and a tribal history that asserted that the Durrani Pashtuns 
should be in charge of Afghanistan – despite the lack of social status that they possessed 
in the tribe.  As veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad, they were less bound by tribal customs, 
and they had learned from their experience, like Mao had learned, that political power 
comes out of the barrel of a gun.  The various mujaheddin veterans who had returned to 
their madrassa studies following the war came to the conclusion that the chaotic situation 
was unacceptable, and that something needed to be done about it – despite the fact that 
none of the old leaders from the jihad seemed to have a plan to end the war.195   
The Haqqania madrassa and other madrassas on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border 
would provide the manpower that fueled the Taliban movement.196  The typical Taliban 
recruit was a male Pashtun between 14 and 24 years of age, a former refugee of the war 
who had grown up in the camps on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border in the North 
West Frontier Province or Baluchistan, and had received their education in the Koran and 
Islamic law from the mostly uneducated and “barely literate” teachers who taught in the 
madrassas in those areas.  They were disconnected from normal Pashtun village life, 
Pashtun history, and their tribes by the war.  Many were orphans, and had lived in the all 
male madrassas while growing up.  As such, they had no societal context beyond that 
which was provided by the madrassas or the camps, where men and women were 
segregated to a greater degree than normal because of the crowded conditions.  When 
their leaders told them that women should be segregated off from the rest of society, this 
was easily accepted as it was consistent with their own personal experience.197 
This mix of people made the Taliban rigid because of their lack of either a broad 
education or exposure to a society that was not confined to a refugee camp.  They simply 
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did not have the background or experience to hold knowledgeable debates about their 
practices with other Muslims, and in some observer’s opinions this disparity in 
knowledge made the Taliban cling to those practices more tightly.198  The origins of the 
Taliban meant that their identities as Pashtuns and as Muslims were both central to their 
collective identity, and indeed these were the only identities many had, particularly 
among the rank and file. It meant that a socially conservative, segregated, lifestyle 
governed by the teachings of the Koran was the norm for the rank and file Taliban foot 
soldier as well as the leadership. 
A. FRAMES OF THE TALIBAN 
The following sections of the paper will discuss the frames the Taliban used to 
mobilize support, identify itself as an organization, and connect to al Qaeda.  The Taliban 
is defined fundamentally by its subethnic collective identity as Durrani Pashtuns, and 
then by its Islamic fundamentalist frame.  These frames are used as diagnostic frames to 
identify what is wrong with Society, as prognostic frames to identify how to fix society, 
and as agency frames to explain why Muslim Pashtuns should help fix the problems 
identified in the manner specified.  The Taliban adds an anti-western diagnostic frame to 
these more intrinsic frames more instrumentally in response to later western pressure and 
bin Laden’s financial incentives.     
1. A Pashtun Identity 
One of the ascriptive identities of the Taliban was that they were all ethnic 
Pashtuns drawn from the Pashtun tribal areas along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.  The 
Taliban was not the only ethnic Pashtun militia group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar led another 
one, but the Taliban ended up assimilating or driving out all of the other Pashtun militia 
groups.  The Taliban movement began in Khandahar, which was Durrani Pashtun tribal 
territory.  Historically the Durrani Pashtuns had ruled Afghanistan, but the tribe had been 
marginalized during the Soviet occupation and subsequent civil war.  None of the major 
mujhadden groups were led by the Durrani, and the Taliban used promises of a return to 
power for the Durrani Pashtuns to mobilize their base while taking over the Pashtun 
                                                 




areas, particularly around Khandahar.199  Later, during the March 1996 Shura, the 
Khandahari faction of Durrani Pashtuns sidelined the Jalalabad faction and legitimized 
the rule of Mullah Omar in a piece of public theater designed to play to the Pashtuns as a 
whole, but the Durrani base in particular.   At the end of the Shura, Mullah Omar, in the 
presence of the tomb of Ahmed Shah Durrani, the first king of Afghanistan, climbed to 
the roof of the Mosque of the Cloak of the Holy Prophet in Khandahar with the Cloak of 
the Prophet Mohammed in hand.  He wrapped himself in the cloak to the roaring 
approval of the crowd, who declared Mullah Omar to be the “Commander of the 
Faithful”, declared the area under Taliban control to be “The Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan” and “called for jihad against Massoud.” 200 
The movement would continue to be dominated by the Khandahar shura, even 
after the government moved to Kabul.  The Khandahari shura, much to the consternation 
of outsiders dealing with the Taliban government in Kabul, would frequently overturn 
decisions made by the Kabul government.  The Khandahar shura did not expand its 
composition beyond its Durrani Pashtun membership as the movement took over the 
country, which made the ultimate decision makers increasing disconnected from the 
people they ruled.  The Kabul shura was also dominated by a Durrani Pashtun majority, 
though other ethnic groups were included.  In conquered areas, the senior bureaucratic 
posts (mayor, governor, police chief, etc) would be controlled by Durrani Pashtuns 
almost exclusively.  Cities conquered by the Taliban were ruled by Pashtun Shuras 
dominated by Durrani Pashtuns.  This created the aura of an occupied area and 
disenfranchised local elites.  When the Taliban did bend and allow non-Durrani Pashtuns 
to assume the position of governor in the various provinces, they emasculated the post 
and restricted their power by frequently rotating the posting of governors and restricting 
their funds.  After conquering Kabul, the other ethnic groups were purged from the 
ministerial bureaucracy and replaced by Pashtuns who were largely unqualified.  While 
governing, the Taliban consistently sidelined other ethnic groups and non-Durrani 
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Pashtun tribes, like the Ghilzais, from positions of power and authority.  Non Durrani 
Pashtuns, regardless of their postings, did not have the pull to accomplish their jobs.201 
Having an ethnic Pashtun identity had foreign policy implications for the Taliban, 
and they helped cement their client relationship with the Pakistani government.  Pakistan 
at least partly backed the Taliban because of their ethnic identity, believing that as 
Pashtuns the Taliban would be amenable to helping Pakistan in its continuing rivalry with 
India, and because having good relations with Afghanistan helped combat Pashtun 
irredentism into the Pashtun areas of Pakistan.  In part, this is also why India backed the 
Northern alliance in the civil war that continued through the 1990s. 202  Pakistan had 
favored Hekmatyar through the Afghan jihad, partly to squeeze out the Durrani royal 
family and solidify Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan, but switched their support to the 
Taliban in the 1990s after Hekmatyar failed to win the Afghan civil war and the Taliban 
cleared up the truck mafia’s transportation problem through Khandahar to Herat.203  In 
this case, battlefield success and ethnic connections played hand in hand. 
2. Islamic Law and Government 
The establishment and maintenance of Islamic Law and Government was one of 
the most prevalent and durable frames of the Taliban.  Mullah Wakil, one of Mullah 
Omar’s aides, said “We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1,400 years ago and 
jihad is our right.  We want to recreate the time of the Prophet….”204  Because the 
Taliban tried to be good Muslims, they set about establishing order by establishing what 
they thought an Islamic Society should look like.  Part of establishing an Islamic Society 
was establishing an Islamic government that ruled through the establishment and 
enforcement of Islamic law (Sharia).  Part of how the Taliban gained initial credibility 
with the Khandaharis was by not asking for compensation for their help in settling 
disputes and enforcing law.  When all the Taliban asked for in return was support for the 
Taliban’s establishment of a “just Islamic system,” the Khandaharis believed that the 
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Taliban was not out for itself, but out for the good of the Afghan people.205  The 
establishment of law and order covered over the anti-modernity aspects of the Taliban’s 
Islamic Law and Government frame.  The Taliban were on a quest to return life to the 
time of the Prophet, and controlling modernity and its impacts on the faith of the 
population was part of accomplishing their goals.206  To not follow Taliban laws and 
edicts was to not be living as God commanded through Muhammad, and was contrary to 
the Taliban’s vision of what society should look like.   
The institution and enforcement of Islamic Law was a major frame for the 
Taliban, and one that they were committed to over the long term, and their interpretation 
of the law affected their ability to continue to attract fighters to their cause from the 
madrassas on the Pakistan border.207  The Taliban, which was an ethnic Pashtun 
movement, used the frame of Islamic law to justify their rule.  The population, who were 
also Muslim, received security and stability in exchange for empowering the Taliban.  
However, the Taliban were quite serious about the Islamic and socially conservative 
nature of the Law and Order they provided because of the beliefs held by their base of 
support.208  The application of Islamic punishments, such as the stoning of adulterers and 
the amputation of thieves’ hands is an example of getting back to God’s laws as revealed 
to Muhammad.209  Taliban’s use of haudud punishments reduced crime in Kabul, and 
establishing order was a big deal for much of the population after more than two decades 
of warfare.  Reestablishment of law and order was one of the reasons that the Taliban’s 
takeover was celebrated in many areas.210  The Taliban banned Western dress, forced the 
women to wear Burqas to adequately seclude them from the world, and forced men to 
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wear Afghan style clothing and beards to better emulate Muhammad.  The Taliban also 
banned human or animal images, music, TV, most sports and games, and imposed 
mandatory collective prayer on the male population.  The Taliban banned paper bags 
because they might contain “recycled pages of the Koran.”211  These measures were 
especially enforced in the cities, which the Taliban considered to be decadent.   In 1998, 
the Taliban shut down all girls schools in Kabul, forced all women off the streets, and 
insisted that the windows of all houses be blackened to prevent women from being 
seen.212  They also banned women from using the general hospitals, and declared that all 
female Muslim UN employees also had to travel with a male blood relative while in 
Afghanistan.213  All of these measures had a common goal:  to bring about the Taliban’s 
vision of what an Islamic society should look like, which is a society that follows God’s 
law as set down by the Prophet in the Sharia and the Hadith.214  In the later 1990s, some 
of the Pashtun areas that had initially acquiesced to Taliban rule began to resist the 
Taliban’s rule because of its severity and because of the ongoing war.215  However, 
because of the composition of the rank and file, the Taliban leadership could not 
compromise on their socially conservative and Islamic interpretation of the law without 
alienating their base of Pashtun Sunni fighters.216 
How the leadership of the Taliban sought to govern and portray its decisions is 
also illustrative of their Islamic Law and Government frame.  At first, the movement was 
fairly open in its decision making, allowing wide input in the Islamic tradition of 
consultation.  In March of 1996, a little over a year after the Taliban exploded out of 
Kandahar, Mullah Omar summoned all of the Pashtun mullahs in the south to Kandahar 
for a Shura217 to discuss the future and legitimize Mullah Omar’s rule.  Militia 
commanders, traditional tribal and clan leaders, political leaders from the war, and non-
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Pashtuns and other foreigners were not invited.218  After the event, the Taliban insisted 
that their Shura had met the Koranic requirement of a meeting of “those empowered to 
take legitimate decisions on the behalf of the Islamic community.”219  As the movement 
moved out of the Durrani Pashtun dominated provinces in the south, the frame that they 
were ruling by God’s law remained, but the movement became increasing insular, and 
refused to broaden inclusion in the decision making process to many members beyond its 
Durrani Pashtun base, to include the Ghilzai Pashtuns, whom the Taliban increasing 
needed as fighters to replace their losses.220  The needs imposed by the ethnic identity of 
the Taliban overcame the requirements imposed by being an Islamic Government to 
consult broadly with society.  After 1996, decision making was also increasing 
concentrated into the hands of Mullah Omar, who consulted outside groups less and less.  
The Taliban insisted that this change in procedure was in line with Islamic law, because 
Mullah Omar had been declared Commander of the Faithful during the 1996 Shura.221   
During the 1996 Shura, Mullah Omar had accepting the baiat, or oaths of fealty, 
from the assembled mullahs after being declared Commander of the Faithful.  
Acceptance of biait was the procedure for succession set down in the period of the rightly 
guided caliphs.  The acceptance of baiat both helped construct a frame of Islamic 
governance and helped to legitimize the Taliban’s rule among outsiders.222  Mullah 
Omar’s donning of Mohammad’s cloak during the Shura was also a powerful means to 
bolster the Taliban’s Islamist credentials because it cloaked the Taliban’s rule in the 
legitimacy of the Prophet himself.223  The Taliban rejected suggestions of implementing 
democracy or western political structures (President, Prime Minister) because they were 
not in concordance with Islamic practice as set forth by Muhammad.224 
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The decision making in the central governing body of the Taliban was justified on 
an Islamic governmental model and the provinces and cities were also governed 
according to what the Taliban insisted was an Islamic model.  When the Taliban occupied 
Kabul, they installed a six man Pashtun (mostly Durrani) Shura of mullahs to govern the 
city.  In doing so, the Taliban installed religious leaders to run what was essentially an 
ethnically exclusive theocracy.  They governed in a similar fashion throughout the rest of 
the country, because this was how they believed Muhammad would have governed.225  
Islamic government, in its many forms, was an important frame for the Taliban because 
they legitimized themselves based on their Islamic credentials.  However, the Taliban did 
not broaden participation in governance as their movement progressed out of the Durrani 
Pashtun areas, essentially limiting the people “empowered to take legitimate decisions on 
the behalf of the Islamic community” to the Durrani Pashtun tribal group, rather than 
broadening the Islamic community to include other ethnic groups.226  Thus the frame of 
Islamic government remained, but the context of participation in it changed with the 
situation. 
The Islamic Law and Government frame affected Taliban dealings with the 
United Nations humanitarian mission and other Non Governmental Organization (NGO) 
efforts in Afghanistan.  The Taliban were suspicious of the United Nations’ motives in 
Afghanistan.  They thought that the UN was against Islam and the “imposition of Sharia 
law” in Afghanistan, and that the UN (influenced by surrounding states) was a key 
stumbling block to the Taliban’s recognition as the legitimate government of 
Afghanistan.227  Being as one of the key demands of the UN in regards to Afghanistan 
was a peaceful solution to the conflict resulting in a democratically chosen, broad based, 
multi-ethnic government the Taliban was not entirely wrong about their conclusion.228  
As donor countries became decreasingly willing to provide humanitarian aid to 
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Afghanistan because of the Taliban’s policies towards women, the Taliban increasingly 
resisted the UN’s efforts to provide aid because of the fear that the UN was promoting 
secularism, which was antiethical to the establishment of an Islamic state.229  Despite the 
international pressure that the Taliban’s policies engendered, the Taliban and their allies 
in the Pakistani ulema community could have cared less.230  The UN pulled out of 
Kandahar in 1998 “after senior Taliban leaders beat up UN staff and threatened them.”231  
Soon thereafter, the Taliban drove the 30 foreign NGOs that were working in Kabul out 
of the country.232  The Taliban, much as it craved recognition as the legitimate 
government over Afghanistan, were unwilling to comply with UN or NGO actions aimed 
to help the people that they governed if such actions were or promoted what they thought 
were un-Islamic practices. 
For the Taliban, the establishment and maintenance of Islamic law and 
government was part of the core of their identity as Muslims.  The Taliban’s Islamism 
was, however, bounded by their Pashtun ethnic identity.  This frame was vitally 
important to the Taliban and not subject to compromise, regardless if the people they 
ruled or the international community liked it or not.  
3. Anti-Western/Anti-American Frame 
The Taliban did not start out as an anti-Western organization, but they 
increasingly adopted that frame as the United States and the United Nations sanctioned, 
used force, and threatened the use of force against them both over human rights 
violations and in the pursuit of Osama bin Laden.  Relations with the United States 
started off well, as the order created by Taliban rule created the possibility of running an 
oil pipeline across the country.  United States government supported UNOCAL’s bid to 
build that pipeline across Afghanistan.233  Ahmed Rashid asserts that the change in the 
Taliban’s thinking on the United States and the West, and increased rhetoric against 
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apostate regimes, is related to the bombing of Afghanistan by the United States in 
response to the 1998 bombings by al Qaeda of the two American Embassies in Africa.  
Ahmed Rashid and Steven Coll, two reporters who have worked extensively in 
Afghanistan and reporting there, both assert that bin Laden converted the Taliban to his 
anti-American point of view.234   
The Taliban rejects modernity and liberal values on human rights because of a 
combination of how their Muslim and Pashtun identities are expressed.  The West was 
essentially unwilling to not comment on the Taliban’s human rights abuses, and the 
United Nations pressured the Taliban to ease up on its female population.  However, the 
conflict between the West, represented by the United States and the United Nations, and 
the Taliban over human rights remained in the diplomatic sphere.  The United States 
“Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called Taliban policies towards women 
“despicable”…[d]uring a …1997 visit to Pakistan.” 235 The UNSC passed two 
resolutions, numbers 1193 and 1214, in 1998 urging the Taliban to treat women better, 
and the U.S. Senate passed a resolution in 1999 “calling on the President not to recognize 
any Afghan government that discriminates against women.”236  These resolutions directly 
played against the Taliban’s frame of the enforcement of Islamic Law; the Taliban’s 
interpretation of the Law drove their policy towards women.  
Meanwhile, Bin Laden effectively bought his way into Taliban circles, building 
Mullah Omar a house, giving other senior leaders money, and contributing troops to feed 
the Taliban advance to the north.  Bin Laden also convinced them of the rightness of his 
anti-American cause, and Taliban rhetoric towards the United States reflected this change 
as recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan was not 
forthcoming.237   
                                                 
234 Rashid,  Taliban, 139-140; Coll, Ghost Wars, 335, 341-343. 
235 Kenneth Katzman,  CRS Report for Congress:  Afghanistan:  Post-War Governance, Security, and 
U.S. Policy.  (Washington, D.C.:  Congressional Research Service, 6 April 2006), 5. 
236 Ibid., 5. 




During the period that these exchanges about human rights were going on, the 
Taliban was also kinetically attacked by the United States when the United States 
responded to the East Africa Embassy bombings by launching cruise missiles at al Qaeda 
targets in Afghanistan.  Prior to 1998, most of the rhetoric directed against the United 
States was mild by any standard, despite the degree of force (in the form of sanctions) 
applied to the Taliban to give up bin Laden and to do better on human rights issues.  At a 
the 1997 summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Islamabad, Mullah 
Omar remarked that the United States’ aid to the Afghan jihad was “remembered “with 
gratitude”… and that [he] hoped the United States would adopt a “correct policy” on the 
issue of continued deployments of its troops to Saudi Arabia.”238  The 1998 missile 
attacks changed the Taliban’s perception of the situation. 
The Taliban protested the 1998 U.S. missile attacks in the streets.  Mobs attacked 
UN offices and Mullah Omar called the United States a terrorist for attacking 
Afghanistan.239  In 1999, the Taliban’s rhetoric hardened further.  In response to false 
reports that the United States was preparing military action against Osama bin Laden in 
August 1999, Mullah Omar called “on Muslims behind the world to stand by their 
brothers in Afghanistan.”240  As UN sanctions loomed over Afghanistan on 03 November 
1999, the Taliban foreign minister, Maulvi Wakil Ahmed Mutawakil, protested that the 
Taliban wanted good relations with the United States, but that the Taliban could not meet 
the U.S. demand to extradite bin Laden for trial.241  By the 12th, “Taliban leader Mullah 
Omar warned of unspecified retribution against U.S. citizens because of the planned 
sanctions.”242  A year later, in response to more proposed sanctions, Mullah Omar told 
the Afghans “that the United States and Russia have a plan to isolate Muslims worldwide 
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beginning with Afghanistan… [and] accused America of using the presence of… bin 
Laden” as an excuse to “thwart the rule of the Taliban.”243  
The Taliban’s anti-American response to western pressure was softened by 
attempts to accommodate western demands without compromising on bin Laden’s 
extradition.  Khandahari Afghans interviewed after the USS COLE attacks in October 
2000 were worried that the U.S. might strike Khandahar, but claimed to like the United 
States.  However, they warned the reporter that further U.S. attacks on their country 
would make “many enemies.”244  Mullah Omar restrained protests against further 
sanctions against Afghanistan in early 2001 that put members of the Pakistani religious 
party Jamiat ulema-e-Islam into the streets.245  The Taliban also hardened its rhetoric on 
bin Laden to give the United States something.  In a June 2001 interview, Mullah Omar 
discredited bin Laden’s fatwas because bin Laden had not completed the required 
religious education to issue one, and offered to try bin Laden in either Afghanistan or a 
third Islamic country in an Islamic court, an offer that the United States dismissed.246  
The Taliban convened trial for bin Laden’s accused support for the 1998 attacks on the 
U.S. embassies in East Africa, but closed the trial because no evidence was produced by 
the UN. 247  The Taliban’s anti American rhetoric hardened still further following the 
September 11th attacks.  In a speech passed to the wider world via the Afghan Islamic 
Press news agency, Mullah Omar claimed that the United States was holding Islam 
hostage, and that the United States “want[ed] the end of the Islamic order” in Afghanistan 
“to create disorder …[and]…a pro-American government.”248   
In summation, the Taliban’s anti-Americanism is a diagnostic frame in response 
to outside pressure from the United States and the United Nations for the Taliban’s 
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support for bin Laden and human rights practices that the West finds abhorrent. The 
Taliban sought good relations with the United States, but found that goal difficult in the 
face of increasing diplomatic, economic, and military pressure from the United States and 
the United Nations.  The Taliban adopted an anti-American frame in response to anti-
Taliban frames from the Americans. 
B. CREATION AND RESILIENCE AL QAEDA’S AFGHAN HAVEN 
In 1996, Sudan expelled bin Laden, family, and his follower from Sudan, and they 
travelled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan to get out of Sudan and away from U.S. pressure.   
Jalalabad was controlled by “a regional shura of eastern Pashtun tribal leaders and 
guerrilla commanders, including Younis Khalis, Mullah Omar’s former guerrilla leader 
whom bin Laden also knew from the war.249  The Jalalabad Shura and the Khandahar 
Shura did not always see eye to eye, and there was a degree of tension between them.  
According to some sources, the Taliban welcomed bin Laden to Afghanistan.  Mullah 
Omar “sent a delegation after his arrival [in Jalalabad] to assure bin Laden that the 
Taliban would be honored to protect him because of his role in the jihad against the 
Soviets.”250  After the fall of Kabul to the Taliban 1996, the Taliban responded to 
American inquires about bin Laden’s whereabouts by saying they did not know where he 
was.   Meanwhile, the Taliban knew exactly where bin Laden was, and offered to deliver 
bin Laden to the Saudis because of bin Laden’s anti-Saudi rhetoric.251  The Saudis, who 
had earlier indicated that they did not care if the Taliban offered bin Laden refuge, 
refused to take bin Laden because they did not want to face the domestic consequences of 
trying and convicting bin Laden.252  As U.S. efforts to extradite bin Laden failed, the U.S. 
banned arms sales to Afghanistan on 14 June 1996 for not cooperating with U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts.253  The United States continued to pursue bin Laden, and the 
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U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Bill Richardson, asked the Taliban to turn over bin  
Laden in April 1998.  His request was denied.254 
On 07 August 1998, following the release of bin Laden’s now famous fatwa 
against the United States and Israel, two al Qaeda teams struck the United States 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.255  The bombings of the U.S. 
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania changed the nature of the international pressure on the 
Taliban.  The United States launched cruise missiles at targets in both Afghanistan and 
Sudan believed to be connected to al Qaeda on 20 August 1998.256  Saudi Arabia, a close 
ally of the Taliban since 1995, pulled its diplomats out of Kabul and stopped providing 
governmental funding to the Taliban in the fall of 1998 over the Taliban’s support of Bin 
Laden.257  A year later, on 4 July 1999, the United States banned all trade and financial 
transactions with the Taliban by U.S. persons or companies, less humanitarian aid, and 
froze the Taliban’s assets in the United States under Executive Order 13129.258  This ban 
froze half a million dollars worth of Ariana Afghan Airlines assets in the United States 
and banned U.S. citizens from flying on the airline.259 
Rather than detaching bin Laden from Afghanistan or killing him, the 1998 
counterattacks on bin Laden’s organization strengthened bin Laden’s reputation.260  
Within Afghanistan, the relationship between bin Laden/al Qaeda and Mullah Omar/the 
Taliban had developed into a strong one prior to the attacks.  Bin Laden spoke in the 
mosques of Kandahar, and Mullah Omar called him out at one sermon “as one of Islam’s 
most important spiritual leaders.”261  Osama bin Laden moved freely through Kandahar 
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and financed the building of mosques within the city, further ingratiating himself with the 
Taliban.  Supporters from outside visited freely.262  The Taliban government allowed bin 
Laden and his entourage to occupy the apartments near the Kandahar airport and Tarnak 
farms outside of the city.263  As an indication of just how good their relationship was, Bin 
Laden had open access to Mullah Omar, who was a recluse.264 
In response to the 1998 cruise missile attacks, the Taliban “organized 
demonstrations” to protest the attacks, and mobs attacked UN offices.265  Mullah Omar 
criticized the attacks as a means to distract the United States public and the world from 
U.S. President Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky, and declared that the United 
States was the “biggest terrorist.”266  Mullah Omar also “insisted that Bin Laden was a 
guest, not just of the Taliban but of the people of Afghanistan and that the Taliban would 
never hand him over to the U.S..”267  He told his own people and bin Laden’s 
organization that “I will not hand over a Muslim to an infidel.”268  Mullah Omar also 
characterized the attack as being not against bin Laden, but a sign of “enmity for the 
Afghan people.”269  The rejection of the power of the United States’ attacks to change 
Taliban policy on bin Laden was more than clear, as was the use of the Taliban’s Muslim 
identity as a reason for protecting bin Laden. 
Beginning with UNSC Resolution 1267 on 15 October 1999, the UN joined the 
effort to have bin Laden extradited to a country that would prosecute him (i.e., the United 
States).  UNSC Resolution 1267 banned commercial air flights into and out of 
Afghanistan and froze Taliban financial assets held abroad.270  The United Arab 
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Emirates, the only country other than Pakistan that continued to recognize the Taliban 
government, endorsed the sanctions on 20 October 1999, further isolating the Taliban.271  
The Taliban offered to either restrict bin Laden’s movements in Afghanistan or to try him 
either in Afghanistan or a third country in an Islamic court.272  Bin Laden suggested that 
he was willing depart Afghanistan if safe passage could be arranged, but the U.S. was 
adamant about extradition.273   UNSCR 1333 of 19 December 2000 placed a further 
restriction on the providence of arms, military equipment, or advisors to the Taliban 
because of lack of compliance with Resolution 1267.274   The United States and the 
United Nations continued to ratchet up the pressure into 2001.  UNSCR 1363 of 30 July 
2001 “provided for monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was 
provided to the Taliban” in an attempt to further isolate the Taliban from their Pakistani 
sponsors.275   
During this period, the United States continued to indicate a willingness to 
negotiate with the Taliban to give up bin Laden in exchange for U.S. recognition of the 
Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.  The United States also made it 
clear that the United States would believe that the Taliban was “complicit” in al Qaeda 
sponsored attacks.276  The Taliban and the United States deadlocked over bin Laden’s 
extradition to the United States for trial.  The Taliban refused to extradite bin Laden to 
the United States for trial, and the United States refused to accept any other compromise 
position after the 1998 Embassy bombings.277  In March 2001, Mullah Omar said "Half 
of my country has been destroyed by two decades of war. If the remaining half is also 
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destroyed in trying to protect Mr Bin Laden, I'm willing for this sacrifice."278  By this 
point, the option of trying bin Laden in a third country under Islamic law was no longer a 
real option.279  The U.S. would maintain diplomatic pressure until the September 11th 
attacks, but with no effect.280   
After the September 11th attacks the United States began discussions with regional 
states, including Pakistan, securing their support by 15 September 2001.281  The United 
States also stepped up pressure on Afghanistan to give up Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda 
for trial.  Between the On 20 September 2001, the United States issued a non-negotiable 
demand that the Taliban extradite Osama bin Laden, protect foreign citizens in 
Afghanistan, close all the terrorist training camps and allow inspections to ensure that the 
camps were shut down.282  The Taliban again refused to extradite bin Laden to the United 
States, but offered to hold talks on the issue.283  On 24 September the United States 
issued an Executive Order freezing bin Laden’s, al Qaeda’s, and al Qaeda affiliated 
group’s funds and prohibiting transactions between the U.S. and those persons or 
groups.284  Also on the 24th of September, Mullah Omar issued a statement demanding 
that, “If America wants to root out terrorism and intimidation, then it should withdraw its 
forces from the Gulf and demonstrate neutrality over the issue of Palestine.”285  The 
following day, Mullah Omar issued another statement saying that the September 11th 
attacks were the result of the U.S. government’s policies in the region that resulted in 
“atrocities in Muslim countries” and denied that bin Laden was capable of carrying out 
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the attacks.286  The United States dismissed reports that the Taliban had lost track of bin 
Laden.287  By the first of October, Mullah Omar’s statements all but dared the United 
States to invade Afghanistan and meet its own destruction.288  Throughout this period, the 
United States continued to emphasize that the United States was the leading provider of 
humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and that the United States would prefer to avoid hurting 
its longtime friends.  On October 4, President Bush offered additional humanitarian aid, 
but decried the Taliban’s unwillingness to distribute what had already been offered.289  
The U.S. President and Congress decided to execute a military overthrow of the Taliban 
in order to prevent further attacks, combat operations began on 7 October 2001, and 
Kabul fell on 13 November 2001.290   
The level of pressure applied to the Taliban to withdraw its al Qaeda haven was 
very intense, and ultimately ineffective.  The haven was extremely resilient to outside 
pressure.  The Taliban probably did not anticipate the strength of the military response 
after the 11 September attacks, but they nevertheless demonstrated a will to resist 
constant and increasing pressure without weakening the haven they provided Al Qaeda.   
C. AL QAEDA’S AND THE TALIBAN’S FRAMES COMPARED 
Al Qaeda and the Taliban did not share an ethnic identity.  The Taliban was a 
Pashtun movement, and its power structure was narrowly focused on a clique of the 
Durrani Pashtun tribe from Khandahar.  Al Qaeda’s members were largely from Egypt 
and the Arabian Peninsula.  However, the Muslim identity shared by Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban had deep roots for both.  Both groups try to emulate the Rashadun.  The Taliban 
expressed their Muslim identity by pursuing the implementation of Islamic law and the 
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foundation of an Islamic state.  Al Qaeda expressed its Muslim identity by railing against 
corrupt Muslim rulers and calling for the return of the caliphate by violent jihad.  Al 
Qaeda governed itself along principles similar to those by which the Taliban governed 
Afghanistan.291  The shared faith in, and institutional practice of, a particular 
interpretation of Islam bound the Taliban and al Qaeda closely together.292   
The final ingredient was perhaps the most potent.  By the late 1990s, the Taliban 
and al Qaeda had acquired a common enemy, and increasingly shared an anti-American 
frame.  While the Taliban said that they wanted friendly relations with the United States, 
it was very hard to pursue good relations when the United States was not being 
particularly friendly in return.  The crux of the animosity that the United States expressed 
towards the Taliban was over harboring bin Laden, but human rights concerns also drove 
the United States to, both unilaterally and through the UN, to sanction and militarily 
attack the Taliban.  As discussed in the section on the Taliban’s anti-American frames, 
the Taliban increasingly adopted an anti-American and anti-Western frame in the face of 
this pressure.  This frame matched perfectly with al Qaeda’s diagnostic frame that the 
West was attacking Islam.  By September 11, 2001, after two years of UN sanctions and a 
bombing attack, the Taliban probably believed that bin Laden was right – the United 
States was out to get them.  And bin Laden could point to the UN sanctions, the 1998 
bombing attack, and U.S. sanctions and diplomatic pressure and say – you’re right, the 
U.S. is out to get you.  Furthermore, this was a fairly easy frame for the Taliban to adopt.  
Western ideas, dress, and cultural mores were already defined by the Taliban as bad.  It 
was not hard, and certainly not contradictory, for the Taliban to then define the purveyor 
of those values and ideas as the enemy as well without compromising the Taliban 
leadership’s connection with their base of support. 
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The Taliban and al Qaeda exchange services.  The Taliban allowed bin Laden to 
run training camps, to promote the revolution from Afghanistan with varying degrees of 
freedom, to move freely throughout the country, and refused to extradite him to a foreign 
country to face criminal charges.  Al Qaeda supported one the Taliban’s vital interests of 
winning the civil war by fielding the 400 man 055 Brigade in 1997 to support the Taliban 
in their fight against the Northern Alliance.293  They also performed construction projects 
to support the regime.  But the relationship was deeper than merely an exchange of 
services.  Mullah Omar refused to give up bin Laden because the relational bond between 
the two organizations made doing so unacceptable to Omar and other Taliban members.  
The common American enemy seems to have driven the Taliban and al Qaeda together in 
the face of pressure rather than splitting them apart.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda was a relational one.  While al 
Qaeda and the Taliban had ethnic differences, they shared a common faith and a common 
enemy.  Both the Taliban and al Qaeda interpreted Islam strictly, and saw Islam as the 
basis for law and government.  While the corrupt rulers that each group wanted to 
overthrow were different, the reason that those rulers were corrupt, primarily because 
they were not Islamic enough, was the same.  Both groups tried to emulate the Rashadun 
when making decisions about government, society, and law and the forms for those 
systems.  The al Qaeda prognostic frame of establishing a broader caliphate across the 
Middle East was a little too broad for the Taliban, and something that they never seemed 
to latch onto.  But until such a caliphate existed, al Qaeda’s desire to establish one did not 
conflict with the Taliban’s frame of establishing Islamic law and government within the 
state boundaries of Afghanistan.  Both groups increasingly shared an anti-American 
frame because of U.S. pressure on them.  As pressure from the West increased on the 
Taliban for their human rights record, it became easier to believe that the United States 
and its allies were out to get the Muslims and to buy into al Qaeda’s frame.  The shared 
sense of a common enemy helped drive the Taliban and al Qaeda together, and helps to 
                                                 




show that these groups shared a collective identity.  That the relationship between al 





The problem of terrorist havens is a policy problem of growing relevance.  As the 
number of havens that in the international community has grown and shrunk over the past 
forty years, one can make the observation that some havens protect those they haven 
better and provide a greater range of services and support to the havened than other 
havens have in the past or do currently.  This thesis focused on the question of what 
makes some havens more resilient to outside pressure than others.  Because the 
conventional wisdom that state failure is causative for terrorist havens does not 
completely answer the question this thesis borrows from the concept in social 
mobilization theory expressed by Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam that transnational 
groups that share collective identity ties with substate groups will have stronger ties than 
similar groups that do not share collective identity ties.294  The way to tell if the groups 
share collective identity ties is to compare the frames used by the groups and the ascribed 
collective identities of the groups.  Direct ties between groups can be described in two 
categories, either a brokered or a relational tie.  Groups that do not share collective 
identity ties have brokered ties and groups that share collective identity ties have 
relational ties.  Theoretically, the stronger haven would be provided by the substate group 
that had the greatest degree of congruence in collective identities with the transnational 
group.   
Accordingly, this theoretical framework was tested by a comparative case study 
of two terrorist havens provided by the National Islamic Front (NIF) of Sudan and the 
Taliban of Afghanistan, respectively, to al Qaeda.  The NIF provided haven to al Qaeda 
between 1991 and 1996, and the Taliban provided haven to al Qaeda from 1996 until the 
present day.  Because of the reputed ease by which al Qaeda was ejected from Sudan 
compared to the relative difficulty in weeding al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, the 
hypothesis predicted that al Qaeda’s ties to the NIF would be brokered ties and that al 
Qaeda’s ties to the Taliban would be relational ones, as defined by Tarrow and 
                                                 




McAdam’s paper.  The frames and ascribed identities of the havening groups were 
compared to al Qaeda’s frames and ascribed identities in the preceding chapters.  Also, 
the level of pressure exerted on each haven by the United States and the international 
community on each haven was also assessed.  The results of these analyses are reviewed 
below. 
Al Qaeda is a jihadi Salafist organization born out of the Afghan jihad during the 
1980s.  As a Salafist organization, al Qaeda governed itself with consultative shuras.  Al 
Qaeda’s membership was composed primarily of ethnic Arabs.  Al Qaeda’s diagnostic 
frame is that the West, led by the United States, is attacking Muslims everywhere aided 
by the corrupt regimes it supports, namely, but not limited to, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  
Al Qaeda identifies the big enemy as the United States and the lesser enemies as the 
corrupt regimes and Israel, who are occupying Islam’s holiest places.  Al Qaeda’s 
proposed solution to this problem is a jihad against the United States to undermine the 
corrupt regimes and Israel, allowing their overthrow and the establishment of a Caliphate 
in their place.  Al Qaeda sells this frame to their fellow Muslims by framing their jihad as 
a jihad against an occupying power, participation in which is mandatory for all Muslims. 
The Sudanese National Islamic Front was an Arab party and their Arab identity 
was congruent with al Qaeda’s.  The NIF also professed to desire the establishment of an 
Islamic State governed by Islamic Law, though the state they advocated was patterned 
after a modern vice a traditional model.  The NIF did not idolize the Rashadun, and this 
showed in their choice of governmental model.  This was a point of difference between 
Salafist al Qaeda and the NIF.  The NIF actively supported revolutionaries across the 
broader Muslim world, undermining Israel, Egypt, and other corrupt governments, but 
they did not identify the United States as an enemy during the 1991–1996 period that 
they provided haven to al Qaeda.  The relationship between al Qaeda and the NIF 
appeared to be based more in an exchange of services than as part of their core values.  
This is the essence of a brokered tie, and this paper assesses that al Qaeda and the NIF 
had a brokered relationship. 
The Taliban, on the other hand, was ethnically different from al Qaeda.  The 




Taliban established an emirate governed by consultative shuras vice a modern state.  The 
Taliban, unlike the NIF and like al Qaeda, looked to the Rashadun for their governmental 
model.  The Taliban’s Pashtun national state may have provided a point of difference 
with al Qaeda in the future, if al Qaeda succeeded in establishing the Caliphate, but it did 
not matter during the period studied.  Under western pressure over human rights and for 
their havening of al Qaeda, the Taliban increasingly adopted an anti-American and anti-
Western frame.  The use of force or perceived threat of use of force by the U.S. 
magnified this frame for the Taliban.  Backed into their corner of the world by U.S. and 
international pressure, al Qaeda’s enemies increasingly looked like the Taliban’s 
enemies.  The Taliban, thus, increasingly matched up with al Qaeda’s primary diagnostic 
frame.  This paper assesses that the Taliban’s and al Qaeda’s ties were relational ones 
because of the great congruence in the two group’s Islamist and Anti-American frames. 
To double check the starting assumption that the level of pressure required to 
eject al Qaeda from Afghanistan was less than what was required to eject al Qaeda from 
Sudan, the level of pressure exerted by the United States and the international community 
on the respective countries was researched and catalogued in the supporting chapters.  
Sudan was listed as a State Sponsor of terror by the United States, received U.S. 
economic sanctions, and faced the withdraw of the U.S. embassy from its soil due to 
threat concerns.  For its refusal, or inability, to extradite the al Qaeda affiliated assassins 
that tried and failed to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995 the UN, 
through a series of UNSC resolutions, asked member states to reduce diplomatic contact, 
restrict the travel of Sudanese officials, and to not hold conferences on Sudanese soil.  
Sudan, absent any criminal charges against bin Laden, expelled bin Laden in 1996 at U.S. 
request in order to improve Sudanese–U.S. relations. 
The Taliban, on the other hand, refused on multiple occasions to extradite bin 
Laden to the U.S. after the U.S. indicted him for acts of terrorism.  In 1996, the U.S. 
banned arms sales to Afghanistan for refusing to cooperate on this issue.  The 1998 East 
Africa Embassy bombings upped the ante, and the U.S. launched missile strikes on 
Afghanistan in response.  In 1999 the U.S. also banned all U.S. trade and financial 




assets.  These measures joined UNSC resolutions that demanded bin Laden’s extradition, 
banned commercial air traffic into or out of Afghanistan and grounded its national airline, 
froze the Taliban’s overseas assets, and banned the sale of arms or provision of military 
advisors to the Taliban.  After 1999, the only country with diplomatic relations was 
Pakistan.  The only discernable effect of these measures was to harden the Taliban’s 
resolve to harbor bin Laden.  In the end, despite the international pressure and 
inducements of foreign aid, the Taliban continued to resist U.S. efforts to extradite bin 
Laden even after the September 11th attacks.  The Afghan haven was significantly more 
resistant to outside pressure, confirming the assumption that underpinned the hypothesis. 
This thesis supports the hypothesis that that relational ties lead to more resilient 
havens and that brokered ties lead to less resilient havens.  Collective identity ties, as 
measured by the frames of the involved groups, appear to be an important factor in 
increasing the resiliency of terrorist havens.  If ascriptive ties were not expressed by both 
groups as a frame, they appeared to not impact haven resilience.  Thus the Pashtun 
Taliban are more supportive of Arab al Qaeda than was the Arab NIF.  Ascriptive ties 
that were framed the same way did increase haven resilience.  Because the Taliban and al 
Qaeda both idolized the past and because of the great deal of similarity between 
Deobandism and Salafism the frames supporting each groups Islamic identity supported 
al Qaeda and the Taliban’s relationship.  However, the NIF was quite adamant about 
being modernist, and this Islamic modernist frame conflicted with al Qaeda’s frames that 
emphasized the Rashadun.  The NIF’s inflexibility on the anti-American frame was 
probably the deal breaker for Sudan’s continued haven of al Qaeda.  The Americans were 
not the NIF’s enemy, and while they could not extradite bin Laden to the United States 
because no charges were yet made public, they were willing to discommode al Qaeda by 
making it find another place to live at the United States’ request.  By contrast, the Taliban 
adopted al Qaeda’s anti-American frame.  Doing so was arguably easier for the Taliban 
than it was for the NIF because the United States and the West are arguably the current 
world standard for modernity and the Taliban was anti-modern while the NIF was 




al Qaeda’s frames and the Taliban’s did, the NIF did not support al Qaeda nearly as well 
as the Taliban did in the face of outside pressure.   
The number of potential and actual havens is too large for the United States to 
handle militarily or engage in focused diplomacy to mitigate their effects.  Understanding 
the factors that contribute to making particular states more likely to act as "good" terrorist 
havens will allow the United States to focus its efforts more appropriately in the Global 
War on Terrorism.  Accordingly, this thesis shows that shared collective identities and 
shared identification of the enemy by the havening organization and the havened group 
will likely increase the level of resistance to pressure from the outside for the havener to 
have the stop providing haven.  Other than overthrowing the regime in question, perhaps 
a better policy option is to reduce barriers to compliance rather than increasing the level 
of pain applied.    
The 9-11 Commission has left policy makers thinking that they understand the 
problem of terrorist havens, but only the surface of the issue has been scratched.  Social 
mobilization theory offers a theoretical framework that can be used to push the 
boundaries and deepen our understanding of terrorist havens.  It might not seem like it, 
but the call put out by Stewart Patrick in early 2006 to push the boundaries of what the 
academic community and policy makers think they know about terrorist havens is still 
wide open.  This study looks at just one transnational terrorist group and the relationship 
between it, the groups that provided it haven, and the international community through 
the lens of social mobilization theory.  There are many future studies that need to be 
done. 
There are several ways to test the validity of these results and see how well this 
theory will continue to hold up.  One of the ways to test the validity of the results of this 
project is to broaden the study to look at other transnational terrorist groups and where 
they havened using the social mobilization theory framework.  Does the same result hold 
for other transnational terrorist organizations? 
Another way to test the validity of these results is to look at these cases through 




framework.  Did al Qaeda merely serve the Taliban’s needs better than they served the 
NIF’s needs?  If another theory is just as explanatory as this one, how valid are these 
results?  The interests and actors paradigm is a hypothesis that needs tested to further 
validate these results. 
There are also other avenues of research to pursue.  One of the aspects of terrorist 
havens that this study does not consider is haven formation.  Does Social Mobilization 
Theory have anything to say about where havens form, as well as their resiliency?  Large 
N studies of terrorist havens and their relationship to state failure are also possible.  This 
work mentions such a possibility in its Introduction, but a deeper study is needed.  Our 
presumed understanding of terrorist havens as a purely failed state phenomenon is an 
illusion, and we need to systematically test other hypotheses in order to broaden our 
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